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The Hidden Structure of
Fact-Finding
Mark Spottswood†
Abstract
This Article offers a new account of legal fact-finding based on the
dual-process framework in cognitive psychology. This line of research
suggests that our brains possess two radically different ways of
thinking. “System 1” cognition is unconscious, fast, and associative,
while “System 2” involves effortful, conscious reasoning. Drawing on
these insights, I describe the ways that unconscious processing and
conscious reflection interact when jurors hear and decide cases. Most
existing evidential models offer useful insights about the ways that
juries use relevant information in deciding cases but fail to account
for situations in which their decisions are likely to be affected by
irrelevant stimuli. The dual-process approach, by contrast, is able to
explain both probative and prejudicial influences on decision making.
As a demonstration, I use the dual-process framework to explain the
surprising result in People v. Rivera, a case in which a jury convicted
a man of rape and murder despite the admission of exonerating DNA
evidence. This result, I suggest, was not the product of an unusually
lazy or unreasonable jury but rather illustrates the way that our
ordinary cognitive processes can lead us to endorse quite unreasonable
results if primed using certain common prosecutorial strategies.
After elaborating the dual-process model in a descriptive form, I
then consider some of its normative implications. Many leading
evidence scholars have argued that verdicts resting on “pure” or
“naked” statistical evidence are problematic. Although the dualprocess model of fact-finding is descriptive rather than normative, it
nevertheless provides surprising insight into this debate by showing
that our intuitive discomfort with verdicts that are based on purely
statistical data may arise from the failure of such evidence to speak in
terms that our unconscious, intuitive System 1 can process reliably. In
such circumstances, intuitions about outcomes should be treated with
caution. Thus, what unites the seemingly disparate examples of the
†
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Rivera trial and the naked statistical evidence debate is that, in both
contexts, it feels right to do wrong.
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Introduction
For quite some time, evidence scholars have debated which
framework—among several competing alternatives—best describes the
process by which judges and juries evaluate evidence and make
verdict decisions.1 This discussion has centered on two rival accounts
of fact-finding. The “Bayesian” family of inferential models seeks to
account for evidential analysis in probabilistic terms, with each new
item of evidence contributing to changes in jurors’ estimations of how
likely it is that disputed facts are true.2 A competing group of
1.

See generally Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship
Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. Rev.
949, 984–97 (2006) (discussing the “New Evidence Scholarship” and the
extended debate between Bayesians and their critics).

2.

See, e.g., Joseph B. Kadane & David A. Schum, A Probabilistic
Analysis of the Sacco and Vanzetti Evidence 26–27 (1996);
Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 498–501 (1970); John
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L.
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theorists asserts that fact-finding involves the construction and
comparison of stories, or narratives, and the fact finder chooses the
narrative that best explains the given pattern of trial evidence,
without any separate consideration of individual probabilities.3
In this Article, I reflect on the shortcomings of both the Bayesian
and story-comparison frameworks as descriptions of how jurors
determine facts in the messy environment of real-world trials. Both
approaches fail to account adequately for the unconscious aspects of
fact-finding.4 And, unfortunately, we cannot fully comprehend how
real jurors are likely to process evidence unless we account for
prejudice and associative intuition in addition to more rational styles
of inference.5

Rev. 1065, 1083–91 (1968) (applying Bayes’ rule to the fact-finding
process in criminal proceedings); David Kaye, The Paradox of the
Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 101, 106–08 (analyzing
statistical evidence under the Bayesian probability formula); Richard O.
Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1022–1041 (1977)
(applying Bayes’ rule to the meaning of evidentiary rules regarding
relevance).
3.

See, e.g., Floris Bex & Douglas Walton, Burdens and Standards of
Proof for Inference to the Best Explanation, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INFORMATION SYSTEMS: JURIX 2010: THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
CONFERENCE 37, 38–45 (Radboud G.F. Winkels ed., 2010) (advancing a
“hybrid theory” as a model of reasoning for burdens of proof); Edward
K. Cheng, Essay, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale L.J.
1254, 1269–71 (2013) (proposing a probabilistic implementation of the
story-comparison approach); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and
Trial, 101 Geo. L.J. 281, 286–92 (2013) (evaluating the relationship
between narrative theory and factual accuracy at trials); John R.
Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation,
22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1621, 1626–27 (2001) (discussing the
considerations undertaken during an abductive thought pattern);
Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best
Explanation, 27 L. & Phil. 223, 224–25 (2008) (contending that the
Bayesian theory overlooks “explanation-based reasoning”); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 519–20 (1991)
(introducing the “Story Model” as an alternative to Bayesian theory).

4.

See discussion infra Part I.C.

5.

A focus on the irrational or unconscious aspects of fact-finding has been
comparatively rare, with little attention paid to it in the inferential
modeling debates. The main counterexamples to this trend are Dan
Simon’s work on coherence networks, Dan Simon, A Third View of the
Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decisionmaking, 71 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 511, 512–13 (2004), and some aspects of Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie’s Story Model, see, e.g., Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’
Decisions, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 991, 999–1004 (2001); Nancy Pennington
& Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 189,
193–96 (1992) (describing the impact on verdict outcomes after
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To see the shortcomings of purely rationalist models, consider
People v. Rivera,6 a case in which an Illinois jury convicted a man for
raping and murdering a child despite compelling forensic DNA
evidence that a different, unidentified person committed the crime.7
Rivera arose from the death of eleven-year-old Holly Staker in 1992.8
Almost twenty years after her murder, an Illinois jury was called to
decide, for the third time,9 whether Juan Rivera committed the
crime.10 The facts of the case were gruesome: the killer had kicked in
the door of the apartment where Holly worked as a babysitter, raped
her both vaginally and anally, and then stabbed and strangled her
until she was dead.11 And the prosecution had an excellent card to
play: when questioned by the police, Rivera had confessed to the
crime.12 In addition to this confession, the State offered evidence
showing that Rivera had tried to concoct a fictitious alibi for the
night of the crime and that other jail inmates had also heard him
confess to the killing.13 Based on the prosecution’s evidence alone, it
would seem like an easy case for conviction.
Once the defense had its say, however, the picture looked
strikingly different. According to new and uncontradicted expert
testimony, DNA samples taken from the semen recovered during
Holly’s autopsy did not match Rivera’s DNA profile.14 What is more,
Rivera was on electronic home monitoring when the crime was
committed, and there were no records suggesting that he had left his
home that night.15 To explain Rivera’s confession, the defense offered
modifying evidence presentation order and varying witness credibility in
an experiment).
6.

No. 92 CF 2751 (Ill. 19th Cir. Ct. May 8, 2009), rev’d 962 N.E.2d 53
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011).

7.

Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 62–63 (reversing and finding the evidence
insufficient to support a verdict of guilty); see also Andrew Martin, The
Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2011, § 6
(Magazine), at 42 (discussing the exculpatory DNA evidence in Rivera’s
case).

8.

962 N.E.2d at 55.

9.

The case was tried twice previously. The first verdict was overturned
due to procedural errors, and the second was vacated in 2006 based on
the newly available exculpatory DNA evidence. Id. at 55–56.

10.

Id. at 56.

11.

Id.

12.

Id. at 57.

13.

Id. at 57–58.

14.

Id. at 58–59.

15.

See Transcript of Trial at 017578 to 017616, People v. Rivera,
No. 92 CF 2751 (Ill. 19th Cir. Ct. May 8, 2009) [hereinafter Trial Tr.].
There was some evidence that electronic home-monitoring systems
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evidence that he had a low IQ that bordered mental retardation; that,
during a break between police interviews, jail medical personnel had
witnessed him behaving in ways suggesting psychosis; that his story
had changed in response to leading questions by the police; and that
his initial confession was inconsistent with the facts of the actual
crime.16
In other words, despite the vivid evidence connecting Rivera to
the crime, he was probably—indeed, almost certainly—not the man
who raped and killed Holly Staker. The jury in Rivera’s case, having
heard all of this evidence, was instructed that Rivera was presumed
innocent and should be convicted only if the jury was convinced of his
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”17 After four days of deliberations,
they concluded that this standard had been met, finding him guilty.18
The result was decried in the media and then eventually reversed on
the ground that the evidence had been insufficient to permit any
reasonable jury to convict.19
It is hard to know what to make of the jurors’ inability to see
reasonable doubt in this pattern of evidence. Although the case was
disturbing, some might wish to construe this as an isolated event with
little overall import.20 The criminal jury, after all, is selected in a
quasi-random fashion from members of the general public, and every
so often that process might select a highly unreasonable group of
people by a mere quirk of statistics. Seen in this light, the case could
be viewed as the random result of a deck stacked against an innocent
defendant, in which an overzealous prosecutor21 and a judge who had

occasionally fail to record violations, but there was no direct evidence
regarding any known malfunctions with Rivera’s own monitoring
system, which had, at other times, notified the government of Rivera’s
violations of his house arrest restrictions. Id.
16.

962 N.E.2d at 60; Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 18294.

17.

Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018194.

18.

962 N.E.2d at 60.

19.

Id. at 67–68.

20.

But see Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where
Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 1–13 (2011) (providing a survey
of wrongful conviction cases, paying particular attention to the frequent
abuse of confessions and eyewitness evidence); id. at 100–02 (describing
other similar cases in which a conviction was obtained despite
exonerating DNA evidence).

21.

See Martin, supra note 7, at 47–48 (describing lead prosecutor Andrew
Mermel’s staunch insistence on obtaining and defending convictions in
multiple cases involving exclusionary forensic evidence or confessions by
third parties).
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already made up his mind that Rivera was guilty22 allowed a weak
case to go before a jury that was either unusually lazy or biased, or
both. But I believe this case deserves closer study. The jury’s decision
in Rivera can be explained in terms of well-studied features of
unconscious cognition that we all share.23 This explanation, in turn,
makes the trial both more understandable and more disturbing,
because it implies that other juries, even if well motivated, might
have reached the same perplexing result if exposed to a similar
pattern of evidence.24
To provide an account of fact-finding that can explain cases like
Rivera, we must depart significantly from the rationalist tradition of
evidential modeling, in search of a framework that can accommodate
prejudicial inferences as well as reasonable inferences. If we limit
ourselves to rational inferences about probabilities and coherent
narratives founded on the admitted evidence, we will be at a loss to
explain why twelve ordinary people could have thought that it was
not just probable, but beyond any reasonable doubt, that Rivera was
Holly’s killer. What we need, instead, is a similarly robust way to
analyze and describe the way that the jury’s views about what
inferences were and were not reasonable were shaped, in significant
part, by irrelevant or prejudicial factors that operated largely outside
the jury’s awareness.
Although evidence scholars have spent a substantial amount of
time chronicling particular ways that we might fall prey to
unconscious biases in the courtroom,25 few scholars have incorporated
22.

See id. at 68 (noting the defense lawyers’ concern that the judge who
had twice convicted Rivera was unfairly favoring the prosecution in
evidentiary rulings).

23.

See discussion infra Part III.

24.

Cf. Garrett, supra note 20, at 100 (noting fifteen other cases in which
defendants were convicted despite the admission of exonerating DNA
evidence).

25.

See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA
L. Rev. 1124, 1128–35 (2012) (focusing on implicit bias based on the
party’s racial identification); Saul M. Kassin & David A. Garfield, Blood
and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of Videotaped Crime
Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J. Applied Soc. Psych. 1459, 1465–70
(1991) (providing empirical evidence on the impacts of gore evidence on
verdict decisions in mock trials); Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter
McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame,
97 Cornell L. Rev. 255, 256–59 (2012) (exploring the impacts of a
defendant’s bad moral character on a mock juror’s construal of evidence
items); D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old
Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for
Heartstrings and Gore, 49 Hastings L.J. 403, 445 (1998) (suggesting
that gruesome or shocking evidence of a crime’s consequences may
encourage juries to subtly downplay their doubts in favor of a
conviction).
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these scattered insights into the broader accounts of inference at
trial.26 We lack, in other words, a framework in which we can examine
inferential prejudice in the organized and systematic way that the
Bayesian and story-comparison accounts bring to the analysis of
inferential probity.
In this Article, I develop a systemic account of the ways that
unconscious cognitive processes interact with the more familiar
aspects of judge and jury decision making.27 In so doing, I will draw
heavily on the dual-process tradition in cognitive psychology. This
dual-process framework, which cognitive scientists developed to
explain a wide variety of seemingly conflicting results in psychological
research, posits that our mental processes can be better understood if
we group them into two competing cognitive “systems” operating side
by side in human decision making.28

26.

For the best-developed prior work in this direction, see Simon, supra
note 5 (developing an associative-network model of inference that
incorporates the phenomenon of coherence shifts) and Paul Thagard,
Why Wasn’t O.J. Convicted? Emotional Coherence in Legal Inference,
17 Cognition & Emotion 361 (2003) (reviewing four different
computational models explaining O.J. Simpson's acquittal and arguing
that the emotional coherence model is the most plausible explanation).

27.

Other authors have suggested that this literature might prove useful as
a means of elucidating the mechanics of fact-finding, but few have
explored the question in depth. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 3, at 299–
300 (describing how doubt and difficulty may prompt jurors to abandon
logic and utilize an unconscious and associative process when making
decisions); Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64
Vand. L. Rev. 143, 184–85 (2011) (analyzing non-evidential aspects
that pose a threat to the integrity of criminal verdicts). The most
detailed attempt to date at analyzing fact-finding in dual-process terms
appears in an article by Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, and
Andrew J. Wistrich, who replicated some cognitive-bias experiments
using judges as research participants. After showing that judicial
intuition can sometimes lead to errors, they suggest that errors can be
systematically reduced by encouraging judges to engage in more
deliberative styles of processing. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 42–43 (2007). As discussed in Parts III and IV
of this Article, my own model complicates this picture substantially by
showing that deliberation will often be used to justify and defend
intuitive conclusions rather than to override them.

28.

See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 19–30
(2011) (introducing “System 1” and “System 2” as two modes of
thinking); Keith E. Stanovich, Rationality and the Reflective
Mind 3–25 (2011) (explaining the “dual-process theory” and its role
within the “Great Rationality Debate”); Timothy D. Wilson,
Strangers
to
Ourselves:
Discovering
the
Adaptive
Unconscious 17–40 (2002) (discussing the “adaptive unconscious” and
its effects on decision making).
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One kind of cognition, frequently called “System 1,” operates
unconsciously and rapidly, producing intuitions that rise to our
attention without any preceding awareness of a problem-solving
process at work.29 We rely on such unconscious cognition during every
moment of our waking lives, often without realizing it: when we
recognize a face in a crowd, when we drive a car along a familiar
route, or when we correctly interpret another person’s emotional state
based on subtleties of their tone of voice or posture, we are
performing complicated reasoning that feels effortless.30
Another kind of cognition, “System 2” for short, often involves
the effortful manipulation of thoughts and images in working memory,
or the focus of conscious attention on a particular target.31 System 2 is
strikingly different from System 1 in several important ways: we
notice and perceive the work involved in System 2 cognition, we find
it effortful and tiring to sustain it for very long, and when we employ
it we are constrained by a limited fund of working memory space.32
Thus, when we do challenging arithmetic in our heads or analyze the
import of an unfamiliar and poorly drafted statute, we find it
necessary to focus and avoid distractions in order to finish the task,
and we will grow tired the longer we persist. Shifting into System 2
thinking offers us the special power to solve problems without
recourse to the patterns of our past experience. But the limited
capacity of this resource means that we can only focus its power on
one problem at a time and must maintain focus and motivation to use
it for any significant length of time.
Dual-process cognitive theory gives us powerful tools with which
to understand cases like Rivera. As I will show in this Article, the
prosecution in Rivera made use of a number of standard rhetorical
strategies that would have been likely to induce strong implicit
associations between Rivera and guilt in the minds of the jurors. Chief
among these strategies was the early use of gruesome crime scene
details, the effort to paint Rivera as a generally untrustworthy person,

29.

See Keith Frankish & Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, The Duality of Mind:
An Historical Perspective, in In Two Minds: Dual Processes and
Beyond 1, 15–18 (Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish eds.,
2009) [hereinafter TWO MINDS] (providing a survey of features associated
with System 1 and System 2 in the dual-process literature).

30.

See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 19–22 (introducing key features of
System 1 and System 2).

31.

See id. at 22–24 (providing examples such as focusing on a particular
person's voice in a crowded and noisy room or parking in a narrow
space).

32.

See id. (“[In System 2 situations,] you must pay attention, and you will
perform less well, or not at all, if you are not ready or if your attention
is directed inappropriately.”).
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and the introduction of redundant and repetitive testimony regarding
Rivera’s confessions.33 By using these common techniques, the
prosecution generated an intuitive sense of Rivera’s guilt that
outstripped the real probity of the evidence it had to offer. The
defense, by contrast, had analytically powerful evidence that was not
nearly so well designed to generate a competing set of associative
intuitions.34 The result was that the jury most likely started
deliberations with the intuition that Rivera was probably guilty,
despite the defense’s strong case.
The final piece of the Rivera puzzle incorporates analytic,
System 2 processing: the jury spent four days in deliberations, most
likely finding ways to minimize their doubts about their intuitively
preferred result so as to accommodate both their unconsciously
derived preference for a guilty verdict and the instruction requiring
them to find Rivera innocent unless his guilt was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.35 In the end, we need to consider the work done by
both cognitive systems to explain why it might have felt reasonable
and proper for the jury to vote to convict, or to predict when
particular kinds of evidence might encourage other juries to reach
similarly unreasonable decisions.
The utility of a dual-process model of fact-finding goes beyond
explaining the disturbing result in one case. We can also apply its
insights to evidence theory itself, as a means of identifying scenarios
where widely shared, normative intuitions about the proper force of
proof are likely to be unreliable. To illustrate this, I use the dualprocess model to reconsider the appropriate weight to give “naked”
statistical evidence at trials. Many influential scholars argue that it
violates fundamental values of fairness or legitimacy to allow jurors to
rest their verdicts on purely statistical evidence.36 At some deep level,
33.

See infra notes 190–210 and accompanying text.

34.

See infra notes 211–22 and accompanying text.

35.

See Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018194.

36.

See, e.g., L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 74–
76, 270–72 (1977) (arguing that, in some cases, the verdict that has the
higher probability is nevertheless unfair); Cheng, supra note 3, at 1265–
66 (“[T]he legal system wants the jury to arrive at some narrative of the
truth.”); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1378–85
(1985) (arguing that awarding proportionate judgment in situations
involving statistical damages cases and developing an accompanying
substantive legal rule is “the primary objective of judicial factfinding”);
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1340–41, 1346–50 (1971)
(“[A] . . . similarity among the cases . . . is less easily dismissed: in all of
them, making use of mathematical information first requires
transforming it from evidence about the generality of cases to evidence
about the particular case before us.”).
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these theorists urge, it feels wrong to determine liability or guilt based
on a guess, even if that guess is more probable than its alternatives.37
But this apparent tension is driven in large part by the failure of
statistical forms of proof to speak to our unconscious System 1 in a
way that would make us feel that the statistically stronger inference is
intuitively true. In fact, the ways that our intuitive patterns of
reasoning betray us when analyzing these hypotheticals closely
parallel what went wrong in the Rivera trial. Both scenarios involve
analytically powerful evidence that nevertheless lacks the sort of
vivid, repetitive detail that can support strong intuitions about guilt
or innocence within our underlying associative system of cognition.
This insight should moderate, if not eliminate entirely, our anxieties
about statistical proof. Taken in connection with the examination of
what went wrong in the Rivera case, this suggests a broader lesson:
before relying on our intuitions about proper case outcomes as a
normative guide for optimal juridical decision making, we should first
make sure that the process generating those intuitions is generally
likely to lead to accurate outcomes.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I introduces existing
models of fact-finding. Part II relates several important aspects of
dual-process cognitive theory that will form the basis of my own
account of fact-finding in the trial environment. Part III presents a
descriptive model of the ways that the two systems of cognition are
likely to operate and interact as a fact finder processes the evidence in
a disputed trial, using the Rivera trial as a discussion example.
Finally, Part IV discusses the importance of accounting for the hidden
associative component of fact-finding cognition when we consider the
utility of purely statistical proof at trial. With this discussion, I hope
to introduce an important new framework for future discussions of
problems in evidence law, one that can accommodate not just the role
of reasoned analysis in fact-finding but also the murky terrain of
hunches, insights, and prejudices.

I.

Existing Models of Fact-Finding

A vast amount of scholarship has attempted to provide either
formal models or informal accounts of the process by which judges
and juries find facts in disputed cases. A full account of this tradition
is well beyond the scope of one article and indeed would be hard to

37.

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 36, at 75 (illustrating how it seems unjust
for A to lose when he is one of 1,000 people at a rodeo, of which 499
paid and 501 did not, because it is more likely than not that he did not
pay). For further discussion of this hypothetical, refer to notes 80–81
and accompanying text.
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cover in a lengthy book.38 My aims in this introduction are far more
modest. First, I will explore the major purposes for which these
models can be used. Second, I will describe the primary tension that
currently divides the literature analyzing how judges and juries reach
verdict decisions—with formal models founded on probability theory
on one side and, on the other side, informal models that emphasize
the construction and comparison of “stories” or “narratives.” Finally,
I will offer a critique of the tendency in this literature to rely
primarily on introspective reflection as a means of understanding how
juries reach decisions, and its comparative lack of attention to other
ways that we can learn about fact-finding.
A.

The Multiple Uses of Evidence Models

Before I stretch the patience of readers by describing probability
networks, abductionist inference, or unconscious associative cognition,
it is worth justifying the essential utility of these abstruse endeavors.
Models of fact-finding inference have real-world value for anyone who
wishes to determine when, and how, our current trial practices might
be improved, and this value makes it worthwhile to spend time
pondering these abstractions. More particularly, there are at least
three different reasons we might want to model the proof process.39
First, we might wish to build descriptive models of fact-finding to
better understand the fact-finding behavior of real-world juries and
judges. A good descriptive model aims to describe the processes by
which fact finders mentally process case evidence in order to reach
verdict decisions.40 For such a model, the criterion of success is not
whether the standards of factual inference it encodes are rational,
ideal, or consistent with judicial doctrine or expectations. Rather, a
38.

For a short introduction to this literature, see generally Park & Saks,
supra note 1, at 984–97 (providing a background on “New Evidence
Scholarship”). For an excellent book-length treatment, see generally
DAVID A. SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC
REASONING (1994) (collecting insights about evidence from different
disciplines).

39.

Cf. Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the
Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 439, 440–50 (1986) (discussing
various reasons why theorists would seek to construct inferential
models); Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence
Theory, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 549–57 (2013) (discussing the
dichotomy between descriptive and normative accounts of proof); see
also
Peter
Tillers,
Trial
by
Mathematics—Reconsidered,
10 L. Probability & Risk 167, 172 (discussing various ways in which
formal models of inference can be useful).

40.

See Lempert, supra note 39, at 448–50 (considering whether the
Bayesian approach can be employed as a descriptive model); Pennington
& Hastie, supra note 5, at 189–92 (elaborating one detailed descriptive
account of proof, the “Story Model”).
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descriptive model succeeds to the extent that it improves our
understanding of how fact finders translate a trial’s inputs, in terms of
evidence, procedures, arguments, and instructions, into outputs, in
the form of findings of fact and verdict decisions. Without this
understanding, we would have difficulty identifying when we need to
intervene in natural reasoning processes by means of evidentiary
rulings, and we would also be hard-pressed to predict how
interventions would impact juries. Just as a contractor would be ill
advised to start excavating a foundation before conducting a survey of
the ground, we risk acting contrary to our own interests if we
interfere with a fact-finding process whose mechanics we do not grasp.
Second, we might wish to construct normative models in order to
articulate both the goals we wish to optimize in the fact-finding
process and particular ways that we could go about achieving such
goals.41 If the descriptive model of evidence acts like a survey, then
the normative model acts like a blueprint, illustrating a desired form
that we might wish fact-finding inference to take. Sometimes a
normative model might function as an ideal standard against which
we measure real-world fact-finding.42 In other circumstances, it might
be adjusted to reflect the perceived limitations of real-world fact
finders and to seek second-best improvements given those limits.43 In
either case, we will find it hard to know whether the existing trial
process works well, or how it can be improved, without a good
normative model of proof.
Third, we might wish to create doctrinal models that seek to
describe significant features of evidentiary doctrines or judicial
attitudes about the nature of fact-finding.44 Doctrinal models can be
of great use to evidence theorists. They may help us predict future
41.

See Jonathan J. Koehler, Audrey Chia & Samuel Lindsey, The Random
Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?,
35 Jurimetrics J. 201, 211–16 (1995) (employing a Bayesian normative
model to identify inferential errors in mock-jury decision making);
Lempert, supra note 39, at 443–48 (discussing a use of Bayes’ rule as a
normative model).

42.

See, e.g., Koehler, Chia & Lindsey, supra note 41, at 211–16 (showing
how jurors, when weighing the value of a DNA match, tend to
overestimate the importance of random match probability in comparison
to a normative model).

43.

See Pardo, supra note 39, at 559 (suggesting that normative models fail
if they cannot provide guidelines that real-world fact finders are capable
of implementing).

44.

See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 39, at 446–47 (labeling such models
“heuristic devices” that “treat[] the law’s rules and procedures
normative and attempt[] to model them”); Lempert, supra note 2,
1021–22 (proposing the use of a Bayesian model as a means
“clarify[ing]” evidentiary rules that “involve weighing evidence in
essentially probabilistic fashion”).
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rulings on unsettled questions by revealing the hidden intuitions that
underlie judicial behavior.45 Similarly, they may help us teach rules to
new lawyers in a way that integrates each rule into a larger, coherent
pattern, facilitating both learning and future recall.46 And finally,
doctrinal theories may be especially valuable when placed side by side
with well-specified descriptive or normative models. When a good
doctrinal model differs from a good descriptive model, it suggests that
judges have a faulty understanding of how fact finders actually
process evidence. Conversely, if a doctrinal model fails to line up with
a normative model, it suggests an area in which there is a need for
judicial education or rule reform.
As should be clear from the discussion above, it is quite possible
that multiple models, even if dramatically different in their structures,
could be useful for those who would attempt to understand or
improve the law of evidence.47 Indeed, it would be an astonishing
coincidence if the best version of all three models was identical in its
particulars because that would mean that the way that jurors actually
reason is both perfectly captured by judicial intuitions about proof
and normatively ideal. Since the real world is not likely to be such a
rosy place, we will best be able to optimize evidentiary rules and
practices only if we are careful to distinguish between descriptive,
normative, and doctrinal models of inference.48
B.

A Brief Taxonomy of Fact-Finding Models

Having set forth the goals of the enterprise, it is now time to
explore the lay of the land. Perhaps the easiest way to chart the
existing literature on fact-finding models is in terms of one mighty
power arrayed against a group of loosely allied enemies. The mighty
power is the Bayesian framework, which has been developed in
exquisite detail during its nearly fifty years of active use. The allied
enemies are the family of theories I have somewhat carelessly lumped
45.

Cf. Tillers, supra note 39, at 172 (noting the value of predicting future
behavior in litigation).

46.

See Lempert, supra note 39, at 447 (discussing the success of Bayes’ rule
as a tool for teaching the concept of relevance to students).

47.

Cf. Simon, supra note 5, at 561–62, 561 n.168 (noting that many
advocates of existing models attempt to deploy them simultaneously to
serve normative and descriptive functions).

48.

See id. at 561–68 (suggesting that a holistic model functions well as a
descriptive account of fact-finding, but for that very reason generates
poor normative recommendations for constraining prejudicial influences
on the jury); see also Koehler, Chia & Lindsey, supra note 41, at 210–16
(showing a disjunction between the evidential force of certain
information about DNA testing as estimated by a normative Bayesian
model and as estimated by a population of mock jurors in an research
setting, and using that disjunction as support for suggested law
reforms).
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together as “story-comparison” frameworks. These theories do overlap
in various respects, but perhaps the clearest commonality is their
united objection to some or all of the assumptions of Bayesianism.
For this reason, the landscape can be most easily understood if we
start with the first approach and then explicate the others by
comparison and contrast.
1.

The Bayesian Model

The Bayesian approach starts with a simple method—drawn from
probability theory—for describing the varying confidence levels a fact
finder might have regarding the probative force of a piece of evidence.
Probability theory offers a way to describe the likelihood of uncertain
events, by grading them on a scale that runs from 0 to 1.49 In the
evidentiary context, we can use these probabilities to represent the
varying levels of subjective confidence a person might have regarding
a belief.50 Thus, the Bayesian strain of probability theory invites us to
imagine a thermometer51 of belief, which runs from 0, representing
total disbelief in a proposition, through 0.5, representing maximal
uncertainty, up to 1, representing total belief. We can then start to
consider the effect of new items of evidence on existing confidence
levels, asking whether the new evidence makes the existing belief
stronger or weaker.52 Thus, we might say that hearing eyewitness
testimony placing a suspect at the scene of a crime moves us to
change our degree of belief in his guilt from 0.6 to 0.9. This means
that our internal feeling of confidence in the proposition has moved
from “I think he did it, but I’m far from certain of it” to “I am quite
confident that he is guilty.”
The real power of the Bayesian approach is that we can
repeatedly apply this updating process, allowing us to describe the
process by which a fact finder considers multiple items of evidence
before arriving at a verdict.53 For example, consider the testimony of
49.

Pardo, supra note 39, at 575 (“[P]robability assessments fall somewhere
on a scale between 1 (which equals certain truth) and 0 (which equals
certain falsity) . . . .”).

50.

Cf. Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 24 (contrasting aleatory
probabilities that “rest entirely on counting operations involving a finite
collection of possible game outcomes, all of which are assumed to be
equally probable[ ],” and epistemic probabilities, which express a
person’s subjective belief that a certain event will occur).

51.

See 6 Jeremy Bentham, Works of Jeremy Bentham 225 (London,
Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., 1843) (developing the metaphor of the
“thermometer of persuasion”).

52.

Terence Anderson, David Schum & William Twining, Analysis
of Evidence 251 (2d ed. 2005).

53.

See Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 127–31 (“Bayes’ rule also
requires us to take account of a variety of interesting evidential
interactions. By an interaction we mean that the evidence is

144

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding

one jailhouse informant in the Rivera case, David Crespo, who
testified that Rivera confessed to the killing one day after a Bible
study class that the two attended in jail.54 Illustrated below, Bayes’
rule provides a way to describe the force that this evidence would
have for a juror whose beliefs followed standard rules for combining
probabilities.55

P(G|e) =

P(G) * P(e|G)
_________
P (e)

This equation tells us how to determine the degree of confidence
that our juror should have in Rivera’s guilt, G, after hearing this new
piece of evidence, e, which we label as the “probability of G given e,”
or P(G|e). In order to determine this quantity using Bayes’ rule, we
combine (1) the juror’s prior confidence in guilt before hearing the
new evidence, P(G); (2) the hypothetical level of confidence the juror
would have that Crespo’s testimony was true assuming that Rivera
was guilty, P(e|G); and (3) the degree to which the juror is convinced
that Rivera really did confess to Crespo, P(e). So a juror’s change in
belief based on Crespo’s testimony can be predicted based solely on
three pieces of information: the previous strength of the juror’s belief
in Rivera’s guilt, the strength of the juror’s belief in the truth of
Crespo’s testimony, and the degree to which the juror believes that
Crespo’s testimony would be likely to arise given the assumption that
Rivera was actually guilty.
Many early Bayesian models imagined the inferential process as a
repeated series of these calculations. In John Kaplan’s seminal paper,
the model started with prior odds of guilt and then—by deciding how
likely it would be to encounter that piece of evidence given either a
hypothesis of innocence or a hypothesis of guilt—repeatedly adjusted
those odds based on each new piece of evidence that was received
using Bayes’ rule.56 This model has the advantage of structural
nonindependent in various ways. What this means is that knowledge of
one item of evidence may influence our judgment of the probative force
of another.”).
54.

People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).

55.

See Schum, supra note 38, at 215 (explaining posterior and prior
probability measures as a way to measure the probability that some
hypothesis of interest, H, changes after additional evidence, E*, is
introduced).

56.

See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1084–85 (“Beginning with what he believes
to be Ω0, the initial likelihood of the defendant's guilt, the decision
theorist will examine the first piece of evidence and determine as best he
can the value of L—the ratio of the probability that the piece of
evidence would have occurred under the hypothesis of guilt to the
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simplicity, even if quantifying the appropriate likelihood ratio for each
new piece of evidence may be a subtle and difficult task.57
Lawrence Tribe vigorously attacked this account of fact-finding
inference and pointed out that this simple version of the model
assumes the conditional independence of the inferences based on
individual items of evidence.58 In lay language, this means that the
model relied on an assumption that the force of earlier pieces of
evidence is unaffected by subsequently received evidence. As Tribe
urged, this is often false with respect to real cases. He offered the
example of an armed robbery case in which the break-in took place
between 3:00 a.m. and 3:30 a.m. and would have required at least
fifteen minutes to accomplish.59 Evidence placing the defendant in his
car a half mile from the scene of the crime at 3:10 a.m. on the night
in question might increase the odds of guilt. Similarly, evidence that
he was driving in his car a half-mile from crime scene at 3:20 a.m., if
evaluated on its own, might have similar force. But the two pieces of
evidence, taken together, are exculpatory given the time required to
commit the crime.60
Based on arguments like this, some modern Bayesians prefer to
frame their models in networked terms rather than linear.61 To deal
with potential interdependencies among items of evidence, Bayes’ rule
requires us to consider the likelihood of observing a piece of evidence
not only given the overall hypotheses of guilt or innocence offered by
either party but also given each preceding piece of evidence seen in
the case.62 A natural way of addressing these interdependencies is to
probability that it would have occurred under the hypothesis of
innocence. He will then calculate Ω1. Similarly, he will find Ω2—the
likelihood of the defendant's guilt after the consideration of the second
piece of evidence and before the consideration of the third piece—by
considering the equation Ω2 = L2 (Ω1).”).
57.

Among other considerations, each likelihood ratio depends significantly
on the many judgments that coalesce into our assessments of a witness’s
credibility. See id. at 1088–91 (describing how to write an equation that
incorporates all requisite potential probabilities for determining a
witness’s credibility).

58.

Tribe, supra note 36 at 1367–68, 1368 n.126.

59.

Id. at 1367.

60.

Id.

61.

See, e.g., Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 242–48, 266–67
(discussing the use of inference networks for complex probabilistic
analyses); Tod S. Levitt & Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, Computational
Inference for Evidential Reasoning in Support of Judicial Proof,
22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1691, 1692 (2001) (“We use Bayesian networks
(‘BNs’) to capture the structure of arguments and to provide a
numerical representation of their strength.” (footnote omitted)).

62.

See Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 127–31.
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switch from a linear to a networked model, in which individual
evidence items contribute to a final verdict decision only through
their contributions to numerous intervening hypotheses about the
factual events under dispute. Thus, one interesting way of
implementing Bayesian analysis into an account of proof is to chart
the relations between individual pieces of evidence, a variety of
intermediate hypotheses of interest to a decision maker, and the final
“facts of consequence” that will determine the outcome of a trial.63
Such “Bayesian networks” can then output a single value, which is
the likelihood that a party is guilty or innocent of a charged crime.64
This complex web of inferential connections allows the model to
address the connections between pieces of evidence at a granular level
and then slowly build up toward the primary facts of interest in the
litigation. This is not the only way to address interdependencies
among evidence items—one could also address them sequentially,
computing the likelihood ratio for each new piece of evidence in light
of its interactions with all of the prior evidence items65—but the
networked approach allows us to visualize those interdependencies.
2.

Bayesianism’s Rivals: Stories, Comparisons, and Coherence

Having described the Bayesian approach to modeling trial
inference, let us consider the alternative approaches. Perhaps the most
prominent alternative account is the “Story Model,” developed by
Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie to explain the results of a variety
of mock-jury experiments. These authors argued that jurors do not
63.

See id. at 133–50 (combining Bayesian-probability computations with a
Wigmorean-chart structure to better facilitate the separation of
independent and nonindependent evidence items); see also Judea
Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference 13–21
(2000) (discussing Bayesian Networks).

64.

See Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 195. Joseph Kadane, David
Schum, and David Kaiser employed a Bayesian-network model of the
major inferences present in the famous trial of Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti, Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass.
1926), and then computed the likelihood that Sacco was guilty based on
a Bayesian combination of the inferences, which were laid out in a
chart, by multiplying likelihood ratios along the graph’s edges. Id. at
193–98. This effort produced twenty-eight charts depicting differing
subsets of the hundreds of units comprising the larger inference network.
See id. at 89–115. Nevertheless, the final product was, as the authors
acknowledged, substantially simplified compared to the task facing the
actual jury. See id. at 281 (“[T]he twelve jurors actually saw and heard
all the trial evidence; we can only read verbal accounts of it in the trial
transcript . . . . [Furthermore,] the [identified] chains of reasoning
resulted from . . . our own imaginative reasoning . . . . [and] are not the
only ones that may be reasonable or plausible.”).

65.

See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical
Challenge, 1 Int’l J. Evid. & Proof 276, 287 (1996).
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compute the probabilistic force of individual pieces of evidence but
instead construct mental narratives that organize and explain the
received evidence.66 When mock jurors are asked to speak aloud while
trying to determine what verdict fits the evidence, their reasoning
tends to invoke “story structures” rather than other plausible
structures.67 According to Pennington and Hastie, these constructed
stories guide the interpretation of subsequent ambiguities in the
evidence, and jurors were more likely to select a particular verdict
when the evidence supporting that verdict was presented in a fashion
that facilitated the construction of a favorable story.68 The authors
then showed in a subsequent paper that when jurors are asked to
provide probability estimates for individual aspects of cases, a
Bayesian combination of these individual probabilities performs poorly
as a predictor of their final decisions.69
Although in their early work they focused on the ways that
constructing a single story shaped a juror’s verdicts, Pennington and
Hastie later incorporated the idea of story comparison into their
theory. They maintained that jurors construct “one or more”
plausible accounts of the disputed events and then choose the most
acceptable story from among the generated set to guide their
subsequent reasoning.70 In cases where more than one story is under
consideration, they posited that jurors would rely on three principles
when choosing between alternatives.71 First, jurors would tend to
prefer stories with better “coverage,” meaning those that accounted
for a greater share of trial evidence than alternatives.72 Second, jurors
would prefer more “coherent” stories, meaning those that were free of
internal contradictions, free of problematic gaps, and plausible based
on the juror’s knowledge of “real or imagined events in the real

66.

See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 189.

67.

See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex
Decision Making, 51 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 242, 252–53
(1986).

68.

See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision
Making:
Effects
of
Memory
Structure
on
Judgment,
14 J. Experimental Psychol. Learning Memory & Cognition
521, 528–30 (1988) (“Subjects were more than twice as likely to find
the defendant guilty of murder in our stimulus case when prosecution
evidence was ordered in story form and defense evidence was not,
compared to when defense evidence was presented in story form and
prosecution evidence was not.”).

69.

See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 199.

70.

Id. at 190.

71.

Id. at 190–91.

72. Id. at 190.
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world.”73 In some cases, the authors suggested that one story would
clearly dominate the alternatives based on these criteria and would be
chosen by the fact finder for the purpose of further decision making in
the case. In other cases, by contrast, both sides will offer accounts
that are internally coherent and have strong connections to the
evidence presented. In such cases, stories “will lack uniqueness, and
great uncertainty will result.”74
Others have argued for the priority of comparative frameworks
over Bayesian models for quite different reasons. Jonathan Cohen
objected not to the use of probabilities in an inferential model but to
the kind of probabilities that Bayesian models employ.75 It was a
mistake to build an inferential theory using cardinal probabilities, he
urged, because they failed to account for the idea of evidential
weight.76 In Cohen’s view, we should grade the strength of an
uncertain inference of fact not merely on the degree to which we
currently accept it as true but also on the amount of evidence we had
accumulated when evaluating the question.77 Thus, we might think
that something is probably true but also know that there was a good
chance that our opinion might change in the future, given that we
had examined only a small subset of available evidence. Cohen urged
that instead of quantifying uncertain beliefs by reference to a fixed
scale with identifiable endpoints, we should instead analyze uncertain
beliefs ordinally, limiting ourselves to ranking competing beliefs in
comparative terms based on the quantity of particularized evidence
that supports either view.78
One driver of Cohen’s discomfort with the Bayesian approach was
his worry that, if taken as a normative model, it recommended
outcomes that ill accord with common-sense intuitions about proof
when applied to certain hypothetical cases. A point of particular
concern involved cases in which proof of liability or guilt was founded
on statistical, rather than particularized, forms of evidence.79 Cohen
developed the “Gatecrasher Hypothetical” to illustrate this concern.
In this stylized example, 499 people paid for admission to a rodeo, but
73. Id. at 191.
74.

Id.

75.

See Cohen, supra note 36, at 121 (arguing that conventional features of
judicial proof are incompatible with Pascalian probabilities and
suggesting that an inductive conception would fare better).

76.

See id. at 36–39 (borrowing the concept of evidential weight from John
Maynard Keynes but arguing that it should assume a more central place
in evidential theory than Keynes assigned it (citing John Maynard
Keynes, A Treatise on Probability 71 (1957))).

77.

Id.

78.

Id. at 40–41.

79.

Id. at 74–81.
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1000 people were seated on the night of the show. No tickets were
issued, and we will assume that a particular attendee, Andrew, is
unable to testify regarding his purchase of a ticket. This implies, in a
probabilistic framework, that there is a 0.501 probability that Andrew
is a gatecrasher.80 But to Cohen and numerous others in the
comparative-evaluation camp, it seems “manifestly unjust” to allow
the rodeo to recover its ticket price from Andrew on the basis of such
proof alone, given that we would have observed the same evidence if
Andrew was actually a member of the ticket-paying minority.81
Cohen’s solution to the paradox invoked his own inductive
probabilities. Purely statistical evidence, he argued, failed to provide
any inductive support to the idea that Andrew was a gatecrasher; as
a result, the plaintiff had no more evidence supporting his case than
the defendant had supporting his own, resulting in a verdict for the
defense.82 Some courts have reasoned similarly, distrusting the idea of
purely statistical proof and insisting that there be a basis on which a
fact finder can “actually believe” that a defendant is liable, rather
than merely thinking it statistically more likely than the alternative.83
More recently, Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen offered another
comparative account of proof as an alternative to Bayesianism, which
they labeled “inference to the best explanation” or “abduction.”84 In
their theory, fact-finding consists of the construction and comparison
of two (or more) differing hypothetical accounts of the events giving
rise to the dispute under trial. A fact finder, after hearing the
evidence, evaluates which of the parties’ stories better explains the
evidence they have heard, and then determines which story better
explains the given pattern of evidence.85 In a civil case, the party with
the stronger story will prevail, whereas in a criminal case, the defense
can prevail even with a weaker story so long as its story is
“plausible.”86 In this framing, fact-finding looks like a tournament
80.

Id. at 75.

81.

Id.

82.

See id. at 271 (describing how courts, by requiring evidence to be
“specifically against” a particular defendant, as opposed to generalized,
help prevent injustices attributable to the standard of proof); see also
discussion infra Part IV.

83.

Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940); see
also Nesson, supra note 36, at 1358–59 (stating that the goal of the factfinding process is to generate “acceptable verdicts,” not “mathematically
probable verdicts”).

84.

See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 223–26 (introducing their
explanation-based account of judicial proof); see also Josephson, supra
note 3, at 1621–22 (distinguishing among the primary meanings of
“abduction”).

85.

Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234–35.

86.

Id. at 234–39.
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between alternative explanations rather than an archeological
reconstruction of the probable truth. By choosing the last story
standing without demanding that it be probably true, abductionists
believe they can avoid some difficulties faced by Bayesian
frameworks.87
Finally, a few authors have articulated another possible
alternative to the Bayesian approach, based on the concept of
coherence networks. Such networks are loosely modeled on the ways
that neurons interact within the brain. They are connectionist in
structure: they incorporate a number of units, which can be activated
to varying extents, and connections between those units, which allow
activation in one unit to amplify or inhibit activation in other linked
units.88 Over time, activation levels will propagate across such
networks until stable recurring patterns of activation are reached. If
we think of the units as representing various beliefs that a juror could
have about a case and the connections as embodying intuitive
judgments of the degree to which those beliefs are coherent with each
other, then this process can be used to simulate the process of
choosing one set of mutually supporting facts about a case while
rejecting a set of inconsistent facts.89
Proponents of these new connectionist inference models generally
maintain that they are largely consistent with other work in the
comparative tradition but are, for varying reasons, inconsistent with
87.

For instance, Allen and Pardo believe that their account avoids the
conjunction paradox and reference-class problem. See id., at 253, 259–
60. But see Edward K. Cheng, Essay, A Practical Solution to the
Reference Class Problem, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 2081, 2084 (2009)
(suggesting that there may be principled ways to choose among
reference classes); Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the
Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1567–75 (2001)
(arguing that the conjunction problem may be more apparent than
real). See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The
Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. Legal
Stud. 107, 111–14 (2007) (describing the reference-class concern);
Nesson, supra note 36, at 1385–86 (describing the conjunction paradox).

88.

See Simon, supra note 5, at 520–21; Paul Thagard, Causal Inference in
Legal Decision Making: Explanatory Coherence vs. Bayesian Networks,
18 Applied Artificial Intelligence 231, 235 (2004) [hereinafter
Thagard’s Causal Inference]; Thagard, supra note 26, at 362–67. See
generally William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism
and the Mind: An Introduction to Parallel Processing in
Networks 1–65 (1991) (contrasting networks and symbol systems as
two approaches to modeling cognition and then introducing a third
approach involving connectionist architecture). For further discussion
and application see infra Part III.A.

89.

See, e.g., Thagard’s Causal Inference, supra note 88, at 237–39
(describing the use of such a network to analyze the competing
inferences in the von Bulow trial).
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formal Bayesian accounts of proof.90 But despite these claims, the
connectionist approach also differs in significant ways from the other
anti-Bayesian models that I have described. First, coherence networks
do not isolate and compare specific explanatory accounts but instead
analyze all the evidence items simultaneously. Second, coherence
networks can accommodate and describe some aspects of fact-finding
cognition that prior models cannot. Dan Simon used a coherence
model to explain the tendency of mock jurors to respond to new items
of seemingly incriminating evidence by inflating their assessments of
the probative force of other, entirely unrelated evidence against that
party. Such “coherence shifts” lie mostly outside the awareness of the
jurors themselves and seem to add problematic and irrational aspects
to the fact-finding process.91 Likewise, Paul Thagard has used such
models to illustrate how an emotional preference for one conclusion
over another might interact with evidentiary strength, using the O.J.
Simpson case as an example.92 Although the utility of connectionist
models is to date little explored in the evidence literature, it is a
promising new direction on which I hope to build in this Article.93
Thus, there remains a hotly contested division between Bayesians
and proponents of competing alternatives. The Bayesian approach, on
the one hand, provides a simple formalization of uncertainty and
characterizes the process of fact-finding in terms of repeated revisions
of internal probability estimations based on each new item of
evidence. The competing models, by contrast, mostly converge on the
idea that evidential evaluation is holistic rather than atomistic; that it
requires the consideration of particularized explanatory narratives,
not just mere statistical likelihoods; and that narratives can and
should be evaluated by comparison with one another rather than in
terms of their absolute force.
C.

What the Existing Discussion Has Taken for Granted

Having explored the contrast between these two approaches, it is
worth stepping back a bit and seeing some of their commonalities.
When one surveys this literature, two common assumptions seem
90.

See e.g., Simon, supra note 5, at 562 (suggesting that the global
coherence shifts exhibited by such models are inconsistent with the
atomistic, piece-by-piece assessments of probative force required in a
Bayesian model); Thagard’s Causal Inference, supra note 88, at 242–43
(suggesting that the coherence network is more intuitively plausible
because Bayesian networks require the specification of a large number of
obscure and unintuitive probabilities, which is not a feature that one
observes introspectively when considering the inferential force of
evidence).

91.

Simon, supra note 5, at 547.

92.

See Thagard, supra note 26, at 372–75.

93.

See discussion infra Part III.
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widespread. The first assumption is that fact-finding is largely an
explicit process that is accessible to introspective analysis. Thus, when
we speak of probabilities in a descriptive Bayesian model, the usual
assumption seems to be that these represent the explicit beliefs held
by fact finders.94 Likewise, when Pennington and Hastie criticized the
Bayesian model for lacking descriptive realism, they focused on
conscious reasoning processes almost exclusively. To demonstrate that
juror decisions are poorly predicted by Bayes’ rule, they relied on
mock jurors’ self-reported probabilistic estimates of the strength of
various trial inferences.95 Similarly, when they wished to suggest that
story construction played a more important role, they relied on the
thoughts that mock jurors reported aloud while deliberating about a
case.96
The second assumption is that evidential reasoning is best
modeled in ways that largely correspond with our common-sense
assumptions about the reasonable force of various kinds of proof.
Although this assumption is rarely defended explicitly, it forms the
bedrock of the standard set of approaches to answering questions in
this field. Neither the Bayesian probabilistic framework nor the
various comparative approaches provide much of a basis for
explaining why judges and jurors sometimes act in ways that seem
unreasonable when analyzed from a reflective distance. The two
primary exceptions to this trend have been the connectionist models
recently deployed by Simon and Thagard,97 but these authors’
attempts to incorporate motivated cognition and emotional bias into
models of the fact-finding process have had distressingly little impact
on the continuing debates between Bayesians and Bayesioskeptics.
Of course, to the extent that these models are used normatively,
as a means of recommending best practices rather than describing
what judges and juries are likely to do in real cases, we are unlikely to
be troubled by either of the above assumptions. It would be difficult,
after all, to imagine a useful way of identifying ideal inference
processes without making those processes both explicit and reliant on
defensible inferential arguments. But even if these two assumptions
are virtues when applied normatively, they limit the reach of our
theorizing when applied in a descriptive context. First, it seems to be
94.

See, e.g., Kadane & Schum, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that they used
subjective, or “epistemic,” probabilities as the basis of their analysis of
the Sacco and Vanzetti case); Nance, supra note 87, at 1600–06
(characterizing Bayesian models as consistency constraints on the
subjective probability estimates of fact finders).

95.

See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 197–201 (describing an
experiment designed to test the Story Model).

96.

Pennington & Hastie, supra note 67, at 245–46.

97.

Simon, supra note 5, at 520–49; Thagard, supra note 26, at 372–76.
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an incontrovertible fact that judges and juries sometimes act
indefensibly.98 But unless we employ accounts of fact-finding that
explain such behavior, any rule-reform suggestions we might make
based upon our models will be ill equipped to deal with our most
problematic cases. Second, as I discuss below, an ever-larger body of
research suggests that a substantial component of real-world
judgments and inferences are derived from an unconscious system of
reasoning that does not obey the common-sense rules of explicit
reasoning. It is my hope that by incorporating this hidden structure of
thought into our conception of fact-finding behavior, we can also
make headway toward understanding why judges and juries
sometimes act in ways that seem to defy reflective common sense.

II. A Primer on Dual-Process Cognition
In recent years, research programs in psychology and neuroscience
have produced a consistent pattern of results, suggesting that our
minds can process information in two dramatically different ways.99
On some tasks, answers come quickly, effortlessly, and automatically,
while at other times, we consciously experience a slow, effortful
process of reasoning to a conclusion.100 Increasingly, researchers have
come to identify these differences as indicative of two different modes
of reasoning and judgment, working side by side in our minds.
Sometimes these modes work collaboratively, but other times they
conflict with each other. Many psychologists refer to these two modes
of processing as “System 1” and “System 2,”101 and I will follow that
98.

See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 55–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(describing a jury conviction after the presentation of highly exculpatory
evidence); Griffin, supra note 3, at 282–85 (discussing the unsettling
case of State v. Jensen, 794 N.W.2d 482, 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010), in
which a jury convicted a man of murdering his wife despite a number of
facts suggesting that it could have been a suicide); see also Susan L.
Gellis, Reasons for Case Reversal in Texas: An Analysis, 16 St.
Mary’s L.J. 299, 307, 318 (1985) (finding, in a sample of Texas
appellate decisions, that a substantial fraction of reversals were based on
the appellate court’s conclusion that there had been insufficient
evidence, or no evidence at all, supporting the jury’s verdict).

99.

See, e.g., Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of
Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 Ann. Rev. Psychol.
255, 256–58 (2008); Frankish & Evans, supra note 29, at 1; Keith E.
Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 Behav. & Brain Sci. 645,
658–59 (2000).

100. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 19–21.
101. See, e.g., id.; Peter Carruthers, An Architecture for Dual Reasoning, in
Two Minds, supra note 29, at 109, 109–12; Keith Frankish, Systems
and Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal-Subpersonal
Distinction, in Two Minds, supra note 29, at 89, 96–102 (2009); see
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convention in this Article. Others are wary of the metaphor of
structurally distinct systems and prefer to think of the two modes of
processing as a family of “Type 1” processes, which share many
important features, and a family of “Type 2” processes, which do not
share the features of the “Type 1” family.102
At the outset, it is important to be as clear as possible about
what, precisely, we are claiming when we describe cognition as
involving two systems or processes. We need not think that a twosystem mind uses two physically separable brain structures; rather,
these terms merely denote two categories of mental processes that can
be usefully separated because the individual processes share certain
common features.103 To say that we have dual-system minds is to say
that the ways in which we learn, encode, and use knowledge when
solving problems can take two very different forms and that, at times,
these differing processes can produce conflicting outputs.104 In this
section, I will outline the terrains in which these two systems operate,
their unique methods of processing information, and the ways that
they interact with each other.

also Jonathan St.B. T. Evans & David E. Over, Rationality
and Reasoning 141 (1996) (providing an early use of the “dual
systems” terminology); Frankish & Evans, supra note 29, at 15 (tracing
the origin of the “System 1/System 2” locution to Keith E. Stanovich
(citing Keith E. Stanovich, Who Is Rational?: Studies of
Individual Differences in Reasoning (1999))).
102. See, e.g., Stanovich, supra note 28, at 18–19 (explaining his preference
for a Type 1/Type 2 terminology to capture a “dual-process theory” as
opposed to a “dual-system theory”); Evans, supra note 99, at 270–71
(“We might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes since
all theories seem to contrast fast, automatic, or unconscious processes
with those that are slow, effortful, and conscious.”). Some theorists
further complicate the account by bifurcating System 2 into multiple
systems. For instance, Stanovich recently proposed a tri-partite model,
which maintains the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes
while further subdividing the latter category into algorithmic and
reflective processes. Stanovich, supra, note 28, at 25–26. But these
refinements of the model’s terminology should not distract from the
basic, widely shared insights that (1) there is more than one type of
mental processing and (2) at least one important analytic cleavage is
captured by the dichotomy between Type 1 processes and other styles of
processing. Id. at 33 (quoting Daniel T. Gilbert, What the Mind’s Not,
in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology 3, 3–4 (Shelly
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)).
103. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 28–29 (explaining that System 1 and
System 2 are “fictional characters” used for explanatory purposes).
104. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 16–17, 19–22.
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System 1 Is a Hidden, Unconscious Information Processor

System 1 processing is implicit rather than explicit. This means
that the work it does occurs outside conscious awareness, so that we
are aware of our conclusions but not the process that produced
them.105 For some, this may come as a startling suggestion; “how,”
you might wonder, “can I think about something without knowing
that I am thinking?” But reflection shows that we are actually
unaware of most of our own cognition. Take, as a simple example, the
act of driving to work on a typical, uneventful morning.106 Over every
second of our journey, we are performing a simply astonishing
quantity of computation. Reflected light enters our eyes in a jumble
of sensation, and we process it extensively to form a model of the
world around us, in which objects are distinct from one another and
related to one another in a three-dimensional spatial model.
Additionally, we are automatically sorting objects in this model so
that we give prioritized attention to signals that relate to the task at
hand. We mostly do not notice the trees and the businesses that line
the side of the road, the details of the cars surrounding us, or the
clouds in the sky, but we respond to traffic signals or brake lights
with automatic ease.107 When we wish to move our vehicle in a
particular direction, we must move our hands and feet in precise
sequences to manipulate vehicular controls, but we do not have to
think about what we will do before we do it.
Sometimes, we can infer that System 1 is at work just based on
the fact that we can perform some mental tasks without felt effort or
focused awareness; thus, when we drive a car without thinking about
it, we know that some unconscious mental activity must be doing the
heavy lifting.108 But System 1 does not only step up to the plate when
105. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 17–41 (2002) (describing the multitude
of roles performed by implicit System 1 processes, which he collectively
labels the “adaptive unconscious”); Ron Sun et al., The Two Systems of
Learning: An Architectural Perspective, in Two Minds, supra note 29,
239, 239–42 (discussing the distinction between implicit and explicit
learning and knowledge).
106. Kahneman, supra note 28, at 29.
107. Id. at 21–22 (noting that System 1 processes can, with effortless ease,
direct our attention where it is needed from moment to moment).
108. With a little introspection, we can identify many other situations where
we perform impressive computational feats with little to no conscious
attention. Other examples include walking down a crowded street,
recognizing familiar faces, performing routine tasks like getting dressed,
and understanding the meaning of sentences written in a familiar
language. When we feel an impulse to walk, we just move from point A
to point B without thinking about our balance or the need to avoid
obstacles. Likewise, when we see a simple sentence written in our native
language, we usually know what it means rapidly and without conscious
analysis. See id.
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we stop paying attention; it is constantly working in the background
of our minds and shaping the way we think even when we are
consciously attending to a particular task.109 So to study the nature of
this hidden but pervasive form of mental processing, it is necessary to
measure how people process information that they are unaware of or
that they think is irrelevant to the task at hand.
An extensive literature has sprung up that does exactly this,
showing that people’s decisions are regularly impacted to a significant
extent by factors that they do not consciously perceive.110 Some of the
clearest examples of such implicit cognition involve people with brain
disorders. For example, people with blindsight are unable to perceive
certain regions of their visual field consciously. If you display objects
to them so that they are only visible in the blinded part of their
vision and then ask them what they saw, they will reply that they
have no idea. But if you let them try to pick the objects out of a
larger group, they will choose the right ones at levels well above
random chance, all the while asserting that their choice was a mere
guess.111 Nor are such phenomena limited to people with brain
disorders; when ordinary people view words that have been flashed on
a screen too quickly to be noticed consciously, they will change their
behavior in response to the subliminal cue without realizing that it
even occurred.112 Our eyes take in, and our brains interpret, more
information than we ever consciously perceive.
What is perhaps most striking about this automatic and implicit
processing is the extent to which it goes on, without our awareness,
even regarding stimuli that we are processing consciously in different
ways. As we encounter objects, words, or concepts in our daily lives,
features of these objects will affect our subsequent behavior even
when we are not aware of any connection. A full catalogue of such
effects is impossible, but a few examples may illustrate the point:


When evaluating ambiguous vignettes, people were more
likely to see immoral behavior in those vignettes if they had

109. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 14, 40–41 (describing the extent to which
unconscious associative processes mediate nearly all significant human
activities—including learning, evaluation, and goal-setting).
110. See id. at 44–48 (noting that even what we perceive as consciously
determined choices can be the product of prior unconscious cognition).
111. Daniel L. Schacter, Implicit Knowledge: New Perspectives on
Unconscious Processes, 89 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 11113,
11113–15 (1992).
112. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 30–31 (describing an experiment in which
participants, after being primed with extremely short displays of words
like “hostile,” “insult,” and “unkind,” subsequently interpreted other
people’s behavior in more negative ways than did a control group, even
though they did not report any awareness they had seen the words).
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recently been exposed to unrelated disgusting stimuli. Thus,
bad smells, a disorderly room, and being asked to recall
disgusting experiences all made it more likely that people
would view particular behavior as immoral.113


When subjects are asked to evaluate a speaker’s credibility,
they will inflate their ratings of that speaker’s honesty if the
speaker is attractive.114 Similarly, when research
participants were asked to monitor the competence of
workers who were performing a maze-solving task, they
generally believed that the more attractive workers were
better at solving the maze, even though they were not.115



People who have been primed with images of money become
more independent and less helpful. They are less likely to
ask for help on difficult tasks and less likely to provide help
when others request it. They even choose to sit farther
away from other people than people who were not similarly
primed.116

As these examples show, unconscious cognitive processing extends
well beyond the domain of behaviors we think of as habitual or
automatic. Rather, implicit System 1 processing plays a role in
determining our beliefs and actions even in the domains we ordinarily
think of as embodying rational or moral behavior.
B. The Associative Structure of System 1 Unconscious Thinking

Having explored one means of differentiating System 1 from
System 2 processes—the fact that System 1 processes occur outside of
our conscious awareness—let us now consider a second point
differentiation: the associative structure of System 1 thinking.
System 1 processes seem to do much of their work by sensing familiar
patterns in sensory data and assimilating those patterns to known
concepts, forming an unconscious associative network.117 Sometimes,
113. Simone Schnall et al., Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment,
34 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1096, 1097–104 (2008).
114. Marc-André Reinhard & Siegfried L. Sporer, Content Versus Source Cue
Information as a Basis for Credibility Judgments: The Impact of Task
Involvement, 41 Soc. Psychol. 93, 95–97 (2010).
115. Markus M. Mobius & Tanya S. Rosenblat, Why Beauty Matters, 96 Am.
Econ. Rev. 222, 228–34 (2006).
116. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money,
314 Science 1154, 1154–56 (2006).
117. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 50–58 (providing examples of priming
and the “complex constellation of responses [that can] occur[ ] quickly,
automatically, and effortlessly” as a result of System 1 processes);
Wilson, supra note 28, at 24–27 (discussing “the adaptive unconscious
as the pattern detector”); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for
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activating these concepts directly prompts us to action. At other
times, the activation of one mental pattern or concept may spread,
without our knowledge, to other related concepts, which then affect
our subsequent behavior.118 The common thread that ties these
influences together lies in System 1’s ability to automatically form
connections between stimuli that tend to occur together, which it uses
to guide our behavior when those stimuli reoccur. System 1, in other
words, learns by association and uses associative connections between
unconsciously represented concepts to prime us toward beliefs,
decisions, and actions that have been associated with similar stimuli
in the past.119
First, let us explore the idea that a fundamental aspect of
System 1 cognition involves assimilating sensory information to
familiar patterns. We are all familiar with one dramatic example of
System 1’s associative power, which is the effortless ease with which
we can recognize the faces of people we know even under poor viewing
conditions.120 As an example, gaze for a minute at Figure 1.

Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 Psychol. Bull. 3, 4 (1996); Eliot R.
Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive
Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory
Systems, 4 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 108, 111 (2000). But
see Evans, supra note 99, at 261 (doubting that some versions of the
dual-process framework, such as the heuristic/systematic processing
account, can be reconciled with associationism). For further discussion
of associative networks and modeling see infra Part II.B.
118. See Timothy P. McNamara, Theories of Priming: II. Types of Primes,
20 J. Experimental Psychol.: Learning Memory & Cognition
507, 514–16 (1994) (providing evidence that priming effects can exhibit
spreading activation patterns).
119. Smith & DeCoster, supra note 117, at 113–14.
120. See Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Authors’ Response,
Advancing the Rationality Debate, 23 Behav. & Brain Sci. 701, 715
(2000) (including face-detection on a list of routine System 1 cognitive
tasks).
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FIGURE 1: A field of shaded squares, arranged to form a particular
pattern.121

At first, many viewers who are unfamiliar with this illusion may
see nothing but arbitrary noise. If they persist, however, most will
eventually perceive the outline of a face (it may help to hold the
image at a distance or to slightly blur one’s vision), which they will
recognize as belonging to Abraham Lincoln. Indeed, once we see the
image, it is hard to make it go away or to see the squares as anything
but a portrait.122 At the same time, though, it is quite hard to put
into words what about the squares, exactly, that makes them so
evocative of Lincoln.
For our next example, consider the poster in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2: Poster for a collegiate drama program.123

Did you notice anything wrong? If not, look again!
121. From Leon D. Harmon & Bela Julesz, Masking in Visual Recognition:
Effects of Two-Dimensional Filtered Noise, 180 Science 1194, 1194
(1973). Reprinted with permission from the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS).
122. Howard Margolis, Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A
Theory of Judgment 37–39 (1987).
123. JOHN P. FRISBY & JAMES V. STONE, SEEING: THE COMPUTATIONAL
APPROACH TO BIOLOGICAL VISION 201 fig.8.32 (2d ed. 2010). Reprinted
with permission from John P. Frisby.
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For many of us—including the people who initially had this
poster printed and distributed before noticing that anything was
wrong with it—the misspelling of the word “Spring” is initially
surprisingly hard to see. Our brains see most of the letters in the word
“Spring” in a context in which that word would be appropriate and
fill in the gap to make the message make sense. But once we have
recognized the mistake, we no longer find it difficult to notice; if
anything, it is hard to take our eyes off it!124
These two images, taken together, help illustrate some profound
facts. First, we can recognize familiar patterns, even when they are
obscured by an astonishing amount of noise. We constantly depend on
this ability without realizing how much mental work is actually
involved in making it possible.125 Indeed, some have suggested that
many dazzling expert performances, such as a chess master’s ability
to quickly recognize a bad move, should be attributed more to the
expert’s familiarity with a large number of situationally significant
patterns than with the expert’s application of rule-like knowledge.126
System 1 allows us to recover meaning even in garbled
communications. If the garbling is small, our associative minds may
recover the appropriate meaning without our ever noticing that
something is wrong. Indeed, if we relax and let System 1 do its
associative work, we can often recover meaning in astonishingly
degraded information streams.127
Second, these two images illustrate the fact that System 1 does
not just allow us to notice patterns; it bosses us into seeing those
patterns to the exclusion of other possibilities.128 The drama poster
shows this most dramatically. At first glance, we may automatically
read the word as “Spring” without noticing anything wrong because
System 1 automatically associated a related pattern of letters to a
known pattern. But once we have seen the misspelling, there is no
going back; System 1 now associates the cluster of inputs to the
somewhat odd and unfamiliar word, “Sring,” and cannot see it any
other way.
System 1, it seems, can recognize patterns with fluid ease, but it
tends to see only one pattern at a time, even when stimuli are
124. MARGOLIS, supra note 122, at 10–11.
125. See Sharon Gilad-Gutnick et al., Recognizing Degraded Faces: The
Contribution of Configural and Featural Cues, 41 Perception 1497,
1497, 1506–08 (2012).
126. See Kahneman, supra note 28, at 11.
127. Idneed, msot radeers wlil hvae reltaievly lttile tourble decdoing tihs
sreioulsy gabrled snetnece bceuase tehy wlil rpadily aissmliate each
mispeleld wrod to a fmaliiar pttaern.
128. See Margolis, supra note 122, at 39–41 (describing this tendency as
“pattern-seeking, pattern-dominated cognition”).
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somewhat ambiguous between multiple possibilities. This is illustrated
most dramatically by the classic illusion of the Necker cube, included
below as Figure 3.

Figure 3: The Necker cube.

The Necker cube shows us the edges of a three-dimensional cube
projected onto a two-dimensional plane, and as such, it is ambiguous.
We can view it so that either the top right or the lower left vertex are
closer to us, with the other on the “back” of the cube. But what is
striking is that we cannot see the cube as ambiguous between the two
states. Seeing the cube as “in-between”—or seeing it as merely a flat
drawing of lines meeting at odd angles on a sheet of paper—is nearly
impossible to do. System 1, it seems, strongly assimilates inputs to a
single pattern and resists ambiguity in classification.129
Perhaps surprisingly, System 1 can perform its patternrecognizing function even when we cannot perceive any patterns
consciously. In one experiment, participants in a gambling game were
offered a choice among several decks of cards from which they could
draw, with rewards and penalties distributed seemingly at random
among the cards in each deck.130 This apparent randomness concealed
a pattern: over time, the gains and losses in some decks averaged out
129. See Paul Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, 12 Behav. & Brain Sci.
435, 438–39 (1989); see also Keith E. Stanovich, Distinguishing the
Reflective, Algorithmic, and Autonomous Minds: Is It Time for a TriProcess Theory?, in Two Minds, supra note 29, at 55, 68–70 (exploring
the concept of focal bias, in which an intuitively attractive
representation becomes focal and dominates further cognition, leading
participants to hunt for confirmatory evidence rather than seek further
information in a neutral way).
130. Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the
Advantageous Strategy, 275 Science 1293, 1293 (1997). Further
evidence of unconscious pattern-learning effects have been developed in
experiments whenever a certain stimulus arises in an ongoing sequence.
See generally Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans, Can Sequence
Learning Be Implicit? New Evidence with the Process Dissociation
Procedure, 8 Psychonomic Bull. & Rev. 343 (2001) (finding that
when data are structured in a way that incorporates complex patterns,
study participants are often able to exploit the pattern unconsciously,
achieving faster reaction times than in control conditions, even though
they are not aware that a pattern exists).
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to a net gain, while in others they averaged out to net losses.
Intriguingly, participants seemed to learn which decks were favorable
before they could verbalize that knowledge; they grew more likely to
choose the winning decks, and they showed signs of stress when
drawing from the losing decks even while they insisted that the decks
seemed equivalent. Thus, they had unconsciously discovered a pattern
without any conscious access to that knowledge.131 To the extent that
our associative minds can notice patterns more subtle than we can
consciously perceive, they may produce intuitions that outpace our
ability to consciously explain.
Now that we have seen the surprising power of System 1, let us
consider some of the ways it may lead us astray. One key difference
between System 1’s associative engine and explicit System 2 cognition
is that the former is unable to ignore particular inputs merely because
they are “irrelevant.” The result is that inputs we would confidently
say are irrelevant to our current tasks sometimes affect our behavior
without our knowing.132
The phenomenon of associative “priming” demonstrates
System 1’s inability to screen out some stimuli as situationally
irrelevant. A standard way to demonstrate priming effects involves
first exposing a participant to a concept in a manner too subtle for
them to perceive and then measuring its impact on their reaction time
in other, related tasks.133 For example, studies show that if we test
people on the speed with which they can distinguish English words
from meaningless garbled letters, a person who had been primed with
the concept “chair” via a quick, subliminal flash of that word on a
screen would show faster reaction times when identifying related
words like “table,” but not unrelated words like “cow.”134 Because of
this variance in reaction times, we know that the unconscious
representation of the “chair” concept has been activated, even though
it was without the person’s awareness.
Associative activations can also spread through intervening
mental concepts, causing some stimuli to have truly surprising effects
on judgment and behavior. Thus, for instance, seeing the word “gift”
has primed study participants to more swiftly recognize the word
“pie,” even though gifts and pies have no direct experiential relation

131. Bechara et al., supra note 130, at 1293.
132. See generally Wilson, supra note 28, at 93–115 (“How well do people
know the causes of their judgments, feelings, and actions? There are
cases in the psychological literature of people who are so ignorant of
why they respond the way they do that they have to invent
explanations.”).
133. Schacter, supra note 111, at 11115.
134. Id.
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for most people, because gifts associate to birthdays, which associate
to cake, which associates to pie.135
Priming may have strong adaptive value, allowing us to respond
more quickly to stimuli that predictably occur in particular settings.
But priming has a darker, stranger side as well. By placing ourselves
in a state of readiness to encounter certain patterns in our
environments, we may also increase the frequency with which we will
perceive those patterns in ambiguous stimuli, and thus introduce a
biasing tendency into our perceptions, choices, or behavior.136 Once we
have started to see a situation in a particular way, we may have
trouble seeing it any other way, regardless of additional evidence.137
In the simplest form of this phenomenon, stereotypical primes
that we encounter in our environments may shape our perceptions or
decisions. Thus, in a disturbing set of experiments, participants
primed with cues that activate mental patterns associated with
African American stereotypes, such as hearing violent rap music, were
more likely to associate an individual in a story who has an African
American–sounding name with hostility, sexism, and low
intelligence.138
When one adds spreading associative connections into the mix,
the picture gets even stranger. Consider, for instance, the “halo
effect,” which describes our tendency to associate one type of positive
trait with other, unrelated traits that also have a positive valence.139
For instance, most people exhibit a “beauty bias”: they tend to
assume that attractive people will exhibit heightened forms of a
variety of positive characteristics, such as kindness, intelligence, and
honesty.140 Perhaps of greatest relevance to the legal system, we
unconsciously expect pretty people to be truth-tellers and thus more
likely to believe what they say, even if we have other means of
assessing their credibility.141 Most of us would find the idea that we
135. See McNamara, supra note 118, at 507, 514–16.
136. See Wilson, supra note 28, at 29–30.
137. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 68–70.
138. See Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit
Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 133, 147 (2002) (finding
that negative stereotypes of African American “may be perpetuated by
(some) rap music, at least in college-aged subjects”).
139. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately
Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1266–67 (2005).
140. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The American
Jury on Trial: Psychological Perspectives 100 (1988); Reinhard
& Sporer, supra note 114, at 95–97.
141. See Reinhard & Sporer, supra note 114, at 101–02.
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are systematically more likely to find attractive people as credible
hard to defend, but such behavior follows a straightforward
associative logic. Beauty, like honesty, is something we praise
culturally, something we generally find pleasing, and something we
view as good rather than bad. Thus, activating our mental
representation of attractiveness primes us to see good, pleasant,
praiseworthy things, and honesty is another pattern matching that
description. For this reason, if we are facing a close question regarding
a person’s believability, their attractiveness may play a role in
determining the answer we find intuitively plausible.142
One further, surprising aspect of associative inferences is that our
physical and emotional feelings can also activate associations that
exert an unconscious influence on our choices and behavior. One
example of this phenomenon, mentioned above, involves the role of
disgust in moral evaluation. Part of our emotional reaction to serious
moral violations can involve a physical feeling of disgust or revulsion.
But in the logic of associative processing, such connections can also
occur in reverse: because we have felt disgusted when sensing norm
violations in the past, we become primed to see norm violations
whenever we feel disgusted, regardless of the reason why.143 Thus,
researchers have found that inducing disgust by clearly irrelevant
means (such as by making a room look disorderly or introducing a
foul smell into the air) makes research participants more likely to
condemn ambiguous behavior as immoral.144
So it turns out that associative cognition can affect our judgments
and decisions in ways that are far from obvious. Although I have set
out some ways in which the associative system can let us down from
time to time, I do not wish to be alarmist. Most of the time,
associative cognition is a powerful and useful tool, allowing us to
recognize patterns based on subtle features even when those features
are blurred by noise or hard to put into words. But if we are to
provide a useful account of the role of such processing in fact-finding

142. In another striking example of spreading associative activity,
participants who were exposed to physical warmth became more likely
to see other people as emotionally warm. See Lawrence E. Williams &
John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal
Warmth, 322 Science 606 (2008).
143. Schnall et al., supra note 113, at 1105.
144. Id. at 1097–105. Similarly, we might feel cross or angry when we ponder
moral violations, and thus we might expect feelings of irritation to
produce similar effects. This is just what we observe. In a recent study,
Israeli judges turned out to be stricter in their sentencing decisions if
they had been sitting on the bench for a long time without a break. See
Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 6889, 6889 (2011).
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cognition, we must keep both its strengths and its weaknesses in
mind.
C.

System 2 Processes Information in a Conscious, Effortful Manner

Having considered System 1 processes in some depth, let us now
turn our attention to System 2 cognition. One of the first key
hallmarks of System 2 processing is that it takes place within the
explicit view of conscious awareness and is thus available to
introspective awareness.145 When System 1 gives us an answer, we
know what the answer is but not how we arrived at it. By contrast,
when System 2 is doing the work, we are aware of the work that goes
into producing the outcome and experience a series of internal steps
involved in getting there.146
A second, closely related hallmark of System 2 cognition is that it
is ego depleting, meaning that we find it mentally taxing to employ
and need to use willpower in order to keep it going.147 All of us, I am
sure, have experienced this feeling, such as when trying to do a
complicated bit of mental math.148 In this respect, System 2 cognitive
processes seem analogous to physical exercise. People generally save
their mental strength if they know they will have to use it in the
future, and if they have recently expended their willpower to focus on
a task, they will find it harder to repeat the performance until they
have rested.149 So, while our associative cognition happens
automatically and effortlessly, our System 2 is activated only with an
effort, and we will find ourselves weary if we use it for too long
without taking a break.
A third significant feature of System 2 is that it often involves the
manipulation of words, symbols, or images held in working memory.150
145. See Evans, supra note 99, at 257–58; see also Carruthers, supra note
101, at 109–10; Frankish, supra note 101, at 96–97.
146. See Evans, supra note 99, at 258–59 (noting that System 2 functions by
means of a sequential flow of conscious thinking through a limitedcapacity working memory system).
147. See Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of
Self-Control: A Meta Analysis, 136 Psychol. Bull. 495, 496 (2010);
E.J. Masicampo & Roy F. Baumeister, Toward a Physiology of DualProcess Reasoning and Judgment: Lemonade, Willpower, and Expensive
Rule-Based Analysis, 19 Psychol. Sci. 255, 259 (2008). See generally
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of
Self-Control, 61 Emory L.J. 501, 538–43 (2013) (reviewing literature on
the strength model of self-control).
148. A simple demonstration of the sensations involved can be obtained by
mentally adding together any two randomly chosen four-digit numbers.
149. See Hagger et al., supra note 147, at 496–97; Masicampo & Baumeister,
supra note 147, at 259–60.
150. See Evans & Over, supra note 101, at 154; Frankish, supra note 101,
at 92–93.
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A bit of introspection shows that many of our conscious thoughts take
linguistic or imagistic form. If we try to monitor the nature of our
own thoughts, we may hear words in our mental ears or see images in
our mind’s eye. For some types of System 2 cognition, such sounds
and images may be an integral part of mental processing.151 For
instance, when we add a column of numbers in our heads or consider
the validity of a logical argument, we often hold symbols in mind in
sequence, mentally applying rules in order to transform them in steps
toward a final result.
To be clear, the fact that symbols or mathematics is at stake is
not a necessary sign of System 2 processing; if we are familiar enough
with a particular problem, we may have integrated its answer into our
underlying associative system. Thus, any adult who has learned his
multiplication tables as a child knows the answer to the question,
“What is 4 times 5?” without having to manipulate any numbers in
active memory. But if the question shifts to, “What is 105 times 32?,”
no answer will spring to mind, and our associative system will be
dumbfounded. Instead, we can solve the problem only by applying a
series of learned rules, and, in so doing, we will experience all of the
hallmarks of System 2 cognition. Our conscious minds will be
occupied, and we will experience the task as effortful. It is this sort of
symbolic manipulation that is another core, identifying feature of
System 2 processing. System 1 can do many things well, but applying
explicitly learned rules to truly novel situations is simply beyond its
capabilities.
One final benefit of System 2’s ability to reason by way of the
sequential manipulation of symbols and images is that it enables us to
more easily consider hypothetical scenarios and their likely
consequences. As we explored above, System 1’s pattern recognition
feature seems to rapidly assimilate even ambiguous stimuli to the
closest known pattern.152 Thus, once we have seen Lincoln’s face in
the squares, it is hard to see other potential patterns that they might
make. This difficulty illustrates the general tendency of System 1
processing to default to a single model of reality.153 But for many
problems that we face—including many problems in the law—the
ability to reason counterfactually is critical. This ability requires
simultaneously knowing the true state of the world and imagining
what would happen if the facts were otherwise. System 2 provides us
with a means to achieve this by letting us consciously manipulate
symbols and images in order to engage in hypothetical reasoning.154
Using these explicit semantic representations, we can describe events
151. See Frankish, supra note 101, at 92–93.
152. See discussion supra Part II.B.
153. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 67.
154. See id. at 21–22, 61–63.
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that we have not observed or which we do not currently believe and
then imagine the consequences that would follow if our imagined
scenarios were true, without—as System 1 would—immediately
treating our descriptions as the true state of affairs. Thus, this System
2 feature enables us to pose hypothetical or counterfactual questions
and explore their answers.
D.

The Complex Interplay of Dual-Process Reasoning

Although the manipulation of symbols and hypothetical scenarios
is an important function of System 2, it is not the whole story. A
significant volume of System 2 activity involves the exercise of selfcontrol, in which we try to guide or restrain the results of automatic
System 1 processing.155 If I tell you to stare intently at a particular
word on a page for a long stretch of time, you will find that your
conscious mind is occupied in an effortful way, indicating that
System 2 is involved in the task. But this sort of effortful focusing of
attention surely does not involve symbol manipulation. Similarly, if
you have committed yourself to losing weight, you may sometimes
find yourself in a common conundrum, in which a tasty treat is
available to you but your goal is to avoid eating it. The common
element in both settings is that we must resist our automatic
impulses, which prompt us to pay attention to distractions and to eat
anything that we associate with pleasurable tastes. And because
System 2 resources require the active use of conscious willpower, we
will find these innate impulses harder to resist as we become
distracted or tired.
This self-control function, combined with System 2’s potential to
use semantic reasoning to avoid associatively driven errors, is
potentially very attractive as a means of improving the judgments
and choices that would arise from an unmonitored System 1. Thus,
for instance, there is a well-documented feature of Type 1 processing
known as “belief bias,” in which people who are trying to work out
whether a logical argument is technically correct will often approve of
faulty arguments if those arguments are used to support true
conclusions.156 It turns out, however, that the extent to which people
fall prey to belief bias hinges on the degree to which System 2
processes are actively involved in solving the problem. Thus, when
155. See Masicampo & Baumeister, supra note 147, at 256. See generally
Klaus Fiedler et al., Exerting Control over Allegedly Automatic
Associative Processes, in Psychology of Self-Regulation:
Cognitive, Affective, and Motivational Processes 249, 249–69
(Joseph P. Forgas et al., eds., 2009) (reviewing literature on executive
overrides of automatic System 1 processes).
156. See Evans, supra note 99, at 264–65; see also Dan Simon, In Doubt:
The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process 22–25 (2012)
(describing this as “conformation bias”).
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research participants must allocate working memory to other tasks or
answer too quickly to think through the problem sequentially, errors
are more likely; conversely, when people are encouraged to reason
deductively, such errors are reduced.157
This potential for these conscious overrides of System 1 responses
suggests that a good way to avoid System 1 errors would be to
employ System 2 reasoning as often as possible. This approach,
however, is not the panacea it may seem. System 2 processing is not
always engaged in order to monitor or override our intuitive impulses.
It can also be engaged to defend or explain such instincts in ways that
make them appear more reasonable than they really are.158
The role of System 2 as an unwitting apologist for the results of
unconscious cognition has been well documented. One type of
evidence comes from studies of “split-brain” patients, who underwent
surgeries to sever the fibers that connected the two hemispheres of
their brains (the corpus callosum) in order to treat chronic seizures.159
The split-brain patients allowed researchers an unusual opportunity
because the left hemispheres of their brains, which typically manage
language functions, had no direct inputs from the right hemispheres,
which lack speech-producing capabilities. In studies of such patients,
researchers have observed a surprising phenomenon: the left, speaking
side of the brain will invent reasons for actions initiated by the right,
silent side, even though the former is ignorant of the stimuli that
motivated the latter’s action.160 Even more strikingly, patients who
engage in such confabulation do not seem to be aware that their
fabricated reasons were not the real reason for their actions.161
157. See Evans, supra note 99, at 264–65 (reviewing literature).
158. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 Psychol. Rev. 814, 818
(2001). See generally Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson,
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,
84 Pscyhol. Rev. 231 (1977) (collecting many examples of
unconsciously confabulated explanations of associatively determined
behaviors).
159. Wilson, supra note 28, at 95.
160. Id. at 96–97.
161. One such patient, P.S., was shown two images simultaneously, one in
each eye, and then asked to choose a card with a related image. The left
side of his brain was shown a picture of a chicken claw, while the right
side was shown a snow scene. When offered the chance to choose a card
with his right hand, he chose a chicken card, which matched what his
left brain had seen; when choosing with his left hand, he chose a shovel,
matching the snowy scene that was shown to his right brain. He found
it easy to explain both decisions: He chose the chicken because it
matched the claw, and he chose the shovel because “you have to clean
out the chicken shed with a shovel.” Id. at 96. But his explanation, of
course, had nothing to do with his choice of the shovel, because his left
hand was guided by his right brain, which had been shown a snowy

169

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding

This sort of confabulation is not confined to split-brain patients,
however. One striking example of System 2’s ability to generate false
reasons for unconsciously induced choices was seen in an experiment
by Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, who arranged
four identical pairs of nylon stockings on a table and then asked
passersby to give them comparative ratings as part of a fictitious
marketing survey. Despite the fact that the stockings were identical,
viewers expressed a clear statistical tendency to prefer the rightmost
item (chosen by 40%) and to disfavor the leftmost item (12%).162 The
exact reasons for this “right-side bias” are somewhat mysterious,163
but the main point is that none of the participants believed that the
location of the stockings had anything to do with their preferences,
and all but one participant (who happened to be a psychology
student) denied that any such influence was possible when asked
directly. Rather, they invented fictitious differences between the
stockings in terms of “knit, weave, sheerness, elasticity or
workmanship” to justify their right-skewing preferences.164
One final example may serve to drive the point home as starkly as
possible. Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt used hypnosis to prime
participants to feel disgust when reading certain words and then had
the participants evaluate several stories.165 One of these stories
involved no plausible moral violation: it described a student council
leader who was “in charge of scheduling discussions about academic
issues” and who tried to choose topics that “appeal to both professors
and students in order to stimulate discussion.”166 Some of the
hypnotically disgusted participants nevertheless rated the student
council member’s actions as morally wrong, even though no unprimed
participant agreed.167 Significantly, some hypnotized participants
invented strained reasons that they claimed explained their peculiar
scene rather than anything to do with chickens. Despite this disconnect,
P.S. “seemed perfectly comfortable with his answer and had no idea
that it was a confabulation.” Id.
162. Timothy de Camp Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of
Verbal Reports of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 Soc.
Psychol. 118, 123 (1978).
163. Cf. Daniel Cassanto, Embodiment of Abstract Concepts: Good and Bad
in Right- and Left-Handers, 138 J. Experimental Psychol.: Gen.
351, 365 (suggesting that right- and left-handed people tend to associate
their dominant side with positive affect ideas and their non-dominant
side with negative affect ideas).
164. Wilson & Nisbett, supra note 162, at 124.
165. Thalia Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral
Judgment More Severe, 16 Psychol. Sci. 780, 780–83 (2005).
166. Id. at 782.
167. Id. at 782–83.
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moral judgments: the council leader, they said, was “up to something”
or was a “popularity-seeking snob.”168
To sum up, our perceptions, decisions, and judgments are the
product of two different, sometimes interacting, modes of cognition.
System 1 processes information swiftly, effortlessly, and automatically;
it has an almost magical ability to detect and recognize patterns. But
the same associative structure that allows System 1 to detect patterns
amidst the noise can fail us when it has been trained on a misleading
set of examples or when some of its associative levers have been
primed into activity by irrelevant stimuli. System 2, by contrast,
works slowly, requires mental effort, and is capable of abstract and
hypothetical analysis. With these capabilities, System 2 plays a dual
role, sometimes overriding System 1’s mistakes and at other times
working to justify our associative intuitions.

III. A Dual-Process Account of Fact-Finding
Now that we have explored dual-process models of ordinary
cognition, it is time to consider how these processes affect legal factfinding. In this Part, I will attempt to describe the ways in which our
two distinct styles of information processing interact when judges and
juries decide cases.
My account places System 1 at center stage: fact finders arrive
with preexisting networks of associations between various potential
facts and concepts of guilt and criminality. Then, fact finders
supplement their networks with new associations based on the case’s
facts and evidence. During the trial itself, System 2 is primarily
engaged in the task of maintaining focus on the evidence items
because of the largely passive nature of the jury and judicial
instructions encouraging them to refrain from decision until the
parties have finished presenting their cases.169 By the end of a trial,
168. Id. at 783.
169. See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 1 Int’l J. Evid. & Proof 254, 261–62 (1996).
(suggesting that juries have preconceived notions about facts and laws,
which may or may not be accurate, and cannot appropriately evaluate
information as they receive it). System 2 is unlikely to significantly
constrain System 1’s associative activity, except through attentional
focus processes—that is, by trying to resist the pull of these distracting
thoughts and to maintain focus on the witnesses’ testimony. In fact,
excessive explicit processing would tend to distract the jury from
listening to the evidence, based on the well-documented phenomena of
inattentional blindness, in which focused mental work generally limits
our ability to attend to environmental stimuli. See, e.g., Christopher F.
Chabris et al., You Do Not Talk About Fight Club If You Do Not Notice
Fight Club: Inattentional Blindness for a Simulated Real-World Assault,
2 Perception 150 (2011) (showing a majority of research participants
who were placed in a cognitive-load condition failed to observe a violent
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most fact finders will have developed intuitive feelings about the right
answer in the case, which will be a product of an unconscious
associative model. At the final stages of a case, however, System 2
processes will also play an important role. By fitting the pieces of
evidence into stories, analyzing the fit between factual judgments and
verdict categories, and applying semantically structured burdens of
proof, judges and juries may use their deliberative faculties either to
protect their intuitions or to override them. Figure 4 may help to
clarify some of these interactions.

Figure 4: Chart depicting the interactions between System 1 and
System 2 cognition processes during a trial.

To make this framework as clear as possible, I will walk through
the ways that it might be applied to understand the factual inferences
that allowed the jury to reach a guilty verdict in Juan Rivera’s case.
This exercise is, by necessity, speculative in nature; I do not have
access to the private thoughts of the jurors in that case,170 and even
the jurors themselves would be unable to report the unconscious
physical confrontation in their environment). An implication of this is
that, when one needs to absorb and retain large quantities of
information, explicit mental processing may undermine—rather than
facilitate—learning.
170. None of the jurors were interviewed in connection with any media
reports following the verdict or the appeal.
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aspects of their fact-finding process. My analysis, moreover, will
necessarily simplify the messy details of a month-long trial. But these
limits should not worry us excessively because the goal of this
discussion is not to implement a fully specified formal model nor to
perfectly describe the reality of fact-finding in one case.171 Rather, my
goal is to provide a descriptive account of the role that the two
systems of cognition might play in a real-life case, and we can make
progress toward this goal without a perfectly specified model or a
godlike window into the minds of individual jurors. As this discussion
will illustrate, a dual-process approach to modeling inference, unlike
standard formulations of the Bayesian or story-comparison
approaches, can explain why the pattern of evidence in cases like
Rivera are likely to induce even well-meaning jurors to make
seemingly indefensible verdict choices.
A.

System 1 Cognition at Trial: The Background Associative Model

To visualize the role of associative networks in fact-finding, it will
help to first establish a useful metaphor: the interactive connectionist
network. Previously described as an alternative to Bayesianism
models, connectionist networks are systems comprising many simple
units, which are connected by edges, or connections, into a larger
network.172 Each unit might be connected with many others, and the
connections may vary in terms of their weight. Over time, the units
can take on various activation values, indicating that the unit is
currently in active use. When one unit is active, the connections
between it and other units will impact the activation values of the
connected units, varying in effect based on the weight of the
connection.173 If the weight is positive, the connection will have an
excitatory effect, such that one active unit will amplify the value of
the unit to which it is linked. If the weight is negative, that unit will
have an inhibitory effect and act to lower the activation value of the
connected unit instead of amplifying it.174 These weighted connections
171. See discussion supra Part II.
172. BECHTEL & ABRAHAMSEN, supra note 88, at 23. I am not the first
researcher to use connectionist models to describe fact-finding cognition.
Cf. Thagard’s Causal Inference, supra note 88, at 232 (exploring judicial
reasoning in a trial according to computational model using both
explanatory coherence and Bayesian networks); Simon, supra note 5, at
520–23 (evaluating a connectionist model to understand coherence shifts
in mock juror cognition). To my knowledge, however, I am the first to
suggest combining a connectionist account of System 1 activity with a
nonconnectionist, motivation-driven account of System 2 activity. For a
more general discussion of the associative cognitive process that informs
the connectionist model see supra Part II.B.
173. BECHTEL & ABRAHAMSEN, supra note 88, at 24.
174. Id. at 24–25.
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allow the network to express, in an intuitive way, the idea that we
have learned to expect to encounter some concepts in combination
(like thunder and lightning), while other concepts tend to imply each
other’s absence (like rain and sunshine).
Finally, such networks may also evolve and learn through the
implementation of rules that allow the weights of connections to
change in response to shifting patterns of unit activations over time.175
Donald Hebb developed a learning rule that can help a connectionist
system learn to more accurately model the associations that are
present in its environment. In his simple model, when two units are
simultaneously activated, the weight of the connection between them
will be strengthened; when one is active and the other suppressed, the
weight will become weakened or even inhibitory.176 Over time, this
means that units that “fire together, wire together.”177
Once a model has been constructed and trained on a set of inputs,
it can simulate certain kinds of cognition. Figure 5 provides a visual
illustration of such a very simple connectionist network, which James
McClelland designed to encode the demographic characteristics of the
members of the two gangs from West Side Story, the “Jets” and the
“Sharks.”178

175. See generally id. at 66–105 (discussing learning strategies that have been
developed for connectionist networks).
176. Id. at 72. See generally Peter Dayan & L.F. Abbott, Theoretical
Neuroscience: Computational and Mathematical Modeling of
Neural Systems 281–93 (2001) (providing background information
about the Hebbian Rule and learning).
177. Bernard J. Baars & Nicole M. Gage, COGNITION, BRAIN, AND
CONSCIOUSNESS: INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 83 (2d ed.
2010).
178. James L. McClelland, Retrieving General and Specific Information from
Stored Knowledge of Specifics, Proc. Third Ann. Conf. Cognitive
Sci. Soc’y 170, 171 (1981). Astute readers will notice that the features
ascribed to members of the Jets and the Sharks bear virtually no
relation to any characters in the actual musical.
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Figure 5: A visual depiction of a connectionist model, illustrating the
characteristics of five hypothetical gang members.179

With the help of Figure 5, the nature of connectionist models
should become clearer. If one activates a unit representing one of the
individuals’ names, the connection flowing away from that unit will
activate a central unit, which will in turn activate other units that
encode various features of that individual.180 Thus, activating the
name “Lance” will lead to activation of his central conceptual
representation unit,181 which will in turn activate the units encoding
for “20s,” “Bookie,” “married,” and so on. These other features, in
turn, will propagate activation further. Thus, by thinking of Lance,
one activates the “Jets” unit, which in turn leads to the weaker
activation of other Jets. This neatly captures the idea that, by

179. From James L. McClelland, Retrieving General and Specific
Information from Stored Knowledge of Specifics, Proc. Third Ann.
Conf. Cognitive Sci. Soc’y 170, 171 fig.1 (1981). Reprinted with
permission from James L. McClelland.
180. See generally Bechtel & Abrahamsen, supra note 88, at 21–47
(describing the features and function of the Jets v. Sharks network).
181. This central unit is a necessary feature of the network because no single
feature, including the name “Lance,” could uniquely describe the
individual in question. Rather, “Lance” is coded as a connected network
of related concepts, including his name, age, gang membership, etc., and
the central unit is what links all those concepts together.
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thinking of Lance, you are primed to think of other members of his
gang.182
These connectionist networks can be implemented as formal
models, but they can also be quite useful as visualization tools,
helping us imagine the nature of networked associative processing,
even as they necessarily simplify away some of the rich details of true
human cognition.183 These models usefully illustrate the ways that
associative activation propagates through the unconscious mind. The
pattern-recognition power of the associative machine, its tendency to
exhibit strange priming effects, and its resistance to updating based
on certain kinds of inputs are all relatively easy to describe in this
framework, regardless of whether we could crack open an individual’s
skull and point to physical structures that map neatly onto the
descriptions below.
With the analytic framework introduced, let us consider the
nature of unconscious factual cognition at trial. The first point that
must be emphasized is that judges and juries do not begin a trial as a
tabula rasa, but rather start the trial with preexisting associative
networks based on their past experiences.184 This means that, before
we can start to describe how a juror might process the Rivera
evidence, we should first consider the existing set of patterns that she
will be predisposed to see in any pattern of evidence.
Thus, let us imagine our hypothetical juror before she has heard
any evidence or arguments in the Rivera case. Before the lawyers and
witnesses have begun to speak, our juror will have already heard
about many criminal cases, whether on the news or in fictional
accounts, some of which may involve similar elements to the case she
is about to hear. From those cases, she may have unconsciously
182. See discussion supra Part II.
183. See Bechtel & Abrahamsen, supra note 88, at 101–03 (suggesting
that connectionist models can integrate associative cognition with rulebased cognition); Sloman, supra note 117, at 6–8, 19–20 (suggesting the
use of connectionist models as a means of capturing associative aspects
of cognition); Thagard, supra note 129, at 438–39 (using a connectionist
network to model features of the Necker cube illusion). Such networks
radically simplify some features of the biological brain, which may
represent concepts in distributed form rather than as isolated and
identifiable units within a larger network. Cf. Dayan & Abbott, supra
note 176, at 230 (suggesting firing-rate models to simulate neural
networks); 2 JAMES L. MCCLELLAND & DAVID E. RUMELHART, PARALLEL
DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING: Psychological and Biological Models,
164–66 (1986) (discussing the benefits of connection information
distribution); Thagard, supra note 129, at 456–57 (distinguishing
connectionist models using distributed representations from those using
localist representations). This simplification is a feature, not a bug,
when we are trying to find ways to visualize the complex and alien
terrain of unconscious cognition.
184. See Simon, supra note 5, at 536.
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learned that certain facts tend to occur in conjunction with other
facts. She starts the trial, in other words, with preexisting associative
schemas connecting the concepts of “rape,” “murder,” and “guilt,”
with other events or ideas. Figure 6 provides a way to visualize the
operation of a small subset of these possible associations, dealing with
concepts that associate closely with rape.185

FIGURE 6: A simple network model illustrating a juror’s possible
associations with rape.

This simple network model is designed to illustrate a few ideas.
First, note that some of the lines between units are solid, which
indicates excitatory associative activation, while other lines are
dotted, suggesting an inhibitory connection. These lines have varying
weights, indicating that some of these relations are more powerful
than others. This is designed to reflect the idea that activating some
concepts in the associative unconscious may activate some related
concepts while inhibiting other, dissonant concepts. For example,
because it is hard to simultaneously intuit that conduct is peaceful
and violent, the activation of one concept suppresses the other. Other
aspects of the network may facilitate the intuitive recognition of guilt
or innocence simultaneously, creating internal tension in the network.
185. See Henry F. Fradella & Kegan Brown, The Effects of Using Social
Scientific Rape Typologies on Juror Decisions to Convict, 31 Law &
Psychol. Rev. 1, 4–6 (2007) (reviewing factors that may influence
juror decisions in rape trials).
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Thus, if a case involved both the use of a weapon and an alleged
assault by an acquaintance, activation would be propagated
simultaneously to the violent unit and the peaceful unit, which would
then actively work to suppress each other, as well as the other units
that are closely related. In such scenarios, the two families of related
units would act competitively, and the model might well exhibit
unstable cycles of fluctuating activations until one set of units
eventually outcompetes the other and the network settles into a
coherent and stable state.186
Figure 6 also illustrates that our preexisting associative schema
may sometimes diverge from what is normatively ideal. Although
some of the connections built into this model are clearly sound—such
as the inhibitory connection between rape and consent—other
connections do not correspond to real-world rape-case patterns. For
example, this model incorporates a widely held, but false, assumption
that rapes are correlated more with encountering strangers than
known associates.187 In fact, the reverse is true: the Department of
Justice estimates that sixty-two percent of rapes are committed by
“intimates” who have a prior sexual relationship with the victim.188
But if the juror is operating with the set of associations described
above, perhaps because that is the pattern of rape cases that the juror
has encountered in the news and on TV, then that juror will tend to
see rape more easily in cases involving strangers rather than
intimates.
B.

The Impact of Party Appearance and Identification on the
Background Associative Model

Having visualized some of the details of a basic, preexisting
associative model, let us now add the information that becomes
available to jurors at the very start of a case. Before any evidence has
been presented, jurors will be placed in the same room with the
parties; there, the jurors will automatically begin integrating the
parties into their associative matrices without realizing that they are
“thinking” about anything at all. Figure 7 illustrates some of the
associations that the Rivera jurors might have formed after sitting

186. See Sloman, supra note 117, at 8 (referring to this state as a point of
“minimum energy or of maximum harmony or coherence” which
provides the desired inference) (citations omitted).
187. See Fradella & Brown, supra note 185, at 4 (noting that stereotypical
beliefs among the public about rape, rape victims, and those accused of
rape are often flawed).
188. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THEONNES, NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, FULL
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 44 (2000).
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through jury selection and receiving initial instructions from the judge
but before the lawyers started their opening statements.

FIGURE 7: A network of pretrial associations a juror may have had with
the defendant, Juan Rivera.

At this stage, all our juror knows is Juan Rivera’s name, what he
looks like, and his status as an accused defendant in a rape-murder
case. Our juror may also know the official rule of our criminal justice
system, which is that Rivera should be presumed innocent until he is
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But our simple model
suggests that, at least at the level of unconscious associative
processing, the jurors likely associated Rivera with guilt rather than
innocence. First, news reports, water-cooler gossip, and crime dramas
on TV are all likely to facilitate a strong associative link between
“defendant” and “guilty.” This association is especially likely given
the rarity with which innocent defendants are encountered in daily
life. Second, the defendant’s ethnicity may also be used, more weakly,
to associatively prime the concept of guilt.189 Finally, it is quite
189. Cf. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW
187, 189–90, 206 (2010) (“[S]tudy participants held strong associations
between Black and Guilty, relative to White and Guilty, and these
implicit associations predicted the way mock jurors evaluated
ambiguous evidence.”); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation,
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1170–71 (2008) (noting the problem of
implicit preference for white over black, except by African American
participants). I am not aware of research demonstrating a HispanicGuilty association as carefully as has been done in studies of implicit
associations regarding African-Americans, but it seems reasonable to
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plausible to expect that our juror will associate lying with guilt, given
that telling lies is itself a norm violation and (sometimes) a crime as
well. Because our juror will be weakly primed by Rivera’s name, role,
and appearance to intuit his guilt, our juror will also be primed to
disbelieve what Rivera will say at trial. Thus, even before the lawyers
begin their opening statements, and despite the nominal presumption
of innocence, we can expect that the jurors will be developing an
unconscious model of the case that connects his identity with guilt
and deception.
C.

System 1 Cognition: Adding Case-Specific Units to the Associative
Network in Response to Trial Evidence

Next, let us consider how a juror’s associative model is altered by
the parties’ presentations of evidence. In Rivera, the prosecution
spent a substantial portion of its case-in-chief asking multiple
witnesses to describe in great detail the scene of the murder. After
both police witnesses and neighbors testified to the sequence of events
that culminated in the discovery of Holly’s body, the jury saw
numerous photographs of her corpse and the gruesome scene,190 as well
as a video walk-through of the apartment taken by police while the
body was still present.191 The prosecution also offered detailed autopsy
testimony, including photos of each stab wound that the killer had
inflicted on Holly, as well as close-up details of injuries to her genitals
and anus from the rape.192 Formally, all of this evidence was only
weakly relevant to the case. Both the prosecution and the defense
agreed that Holly had been brutally raped and murdered. And
although the prosecution wished to suggest that the dirty scene or
careless autopsy practices might have led to contamination of the
forensic DNA evidence, that contention was rejected by all the expert
witnesses who testified on that subject.193 Indeed, perhaps for this
reason, the defense did not even bother to cross-examine many of
these initial witnesses.

assume that similar associations exist. And even if there were no direct
associations of that type, we would expect spreading activation to follow
a Hispanic-Minority-Black-Guilty path, so that even in the best-case
scenario, Rivera’s ethnicity would have weakly primed the idea of guilt.
190. See, e.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 013868 (describing the admittance
of a crime scene photo of Holly’s nude and bloody corpse to the jury);
id. at 013908–21 (describing the admission of many additional photos,
including shots of blood-covered toys and the victim’s bloody handprints
on the wall).
191. Id. at 013897–901.
192. Id. at 015760–812.
193. People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 58–59, 62–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
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Although this res gestae evidence might seem inconsequential if
viewed from a detached, analytical standpoint, it may have been quite
powerful in its ability to structure the associative networks that the
jurors were unconsciously constructing. In terms of the testimony
itself, the repeated references and images of Holly’s body and its
condition would create associations only between that girl and
concepts like violence, blood, and death. But the evidence in the case
was not the only sensory input that was training this fledgling
associative network; rather, the jury was also subject to the ongoing
stimulus of the defendant’s presence in the room. Figure 8 illustrates
these associations.

FIGURE 8: An associative network that jurors may have been
constructing during the trial of Juan Rivera.

Thus, with an associative network already somewhat primed to
associate Rivera, a non-Caucasian defendant, with guilt generally and
therefore with rape and murder more specifically, the jurors started
the case by encountering a steady stream of images of violent death
with Rivera in the room as a continuing co-stimulus. And although
there were many other individuals in the room, it is quite likely that
the jurors gave special focus to Rivera, in part because it would be all
too human to ask, under such circumstances, whether the person in
front of you could have done such awful things. Thus, by having the
jurors share a room with Rivera and pictures of gruesome death for
several days, the prosecution was likely able to induce a reasonably
strong unconscious association between Rivera, the scene of the crime,
and the violent nature of Holly’s death. As a result, the jurors would
have had a natural tendency to interpret subsequent ambiguous
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evidence in a manner that was consistent with these associations.194
Here we see a key way that the dual-process model differs from prior
approaches: evidence that no one would think of as relevant to the
defendant’s claimed alibi defense may, at the unconscious level, be
priming jurors to view that defense with skepticism when it is raised
later in the trial.
After exposing the jury to extensive images and testimony about
the crime itself, the prosecution next called multiple witnesses who
recounted various instances where Rivera lied to officers during the
early phases of the murder investigation. According to several
witnesses, Rivera had, at various times, claimed he attended, on the
night of the crime, a party that never occurred;195 alleged another
individual was guilty of the crime, even though that individual was in
fact not involved;196 and asked an acquaintance to help him concoct
an alibi for the night of the crime.197 This phase of the prosecution’s
case had one obvious, evidentially proper purpose: to suggest that
because Rivera was telling lies relating to the crime, he may have
been conscious of his own guilt and trying to deflect investigators’
interest onto other targets.
This evidence, however, would also have a more nuanced impact
on the jury’s fact-finding in a second, more subtle way. Connecting
Rivera with lying may have significantly influenced the jurors’
unconscious associative models of the case, triggering other
associations that weakened Rivera’s subsequent positions in
nonobvious ways. Thus, because we generally associate lying with
bad, immoral, guilty behavior, the jury was likely further primed to
view Rivera as a person likely to engage in other kinds of bad
194. See Simon, supra note 5, at 537–38 (describing the impact of adverse
information about a defendant on a coherence network); cf. Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997) (discussing the prejudicial
effect of evidence of a defendant’s past violent crime); Risinger, supra
note 25, at 442–46 (suggesting that prosecutors use heartstrings-andgore evidence in part because seeing the “horror of the crime” may make
jurors less willing to bear the risk of a wrongful acquittal).
195. Rivera had claimed that he went to a party at the home of a friend,
Shanita Craig, located near the scene of the crime. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d
at 56. In fact, there was no party at Craig’s house that night. Id.
196. Rivera had reported to investigators that he saw a Hispanic or African
American individual leave Craig’s party for an hour and then return to
the party in a disheveled state. The man, according to Rivera, had been
breathless and sweaty when he returned, with disheveled clothing and a
bloody scratch on his face. See, e.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at
013967–68. Rivera later admitted that this, like his attendance at the
party, was a fabrication. Id. at 014212.
197. According to a man named Michael Jackson, Rivera had made this
request while the two were in the Lake County jail. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d
at 58.
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behavior, including the rape and murder at issue.198 But this strong
link between Rivera and lying would also, quite likely, help prime the
jurors to view other people connected with Rivera as liars themselves.
Thus, by strongly painting Rivera as a liar, the prosecution also
effectively planted the suggestion—in the jury’s unconscious
associative network—that his counsel, his family, and other witnesses
on his behalf might also be lying. Even though he never took the
stand, Rivera’s lack of credibility may have spread like a virus to
inspire instinctive distrust of his whole “team.”
Now we arrive at the heart of the prosecution’s case: Rivera’s
various confessions. This was, in one sense, the strongest evidence of
guilt in the case. Rivera had told multiple people, including police and
(allegedly) various other jail inmates, that he was responsible for
Holly’s death.199 He even signed two written statements that
purported to recount his confessions to police officers.200 For most
people, it is common sense to think that an innocent person would
not willingly admit to committing a crime unless the confession was
coerced.201 But despite the apparent power of this evidence, it also
presented serious difficulties for the prosecution. Rivera’s confessions
to the police initially involved multiple incorrect details that the killer
would seemingly have gotten right.202 It was only after further
interrogation that a second statement, which resolved many of the
inaccuracies, was produced, raising the possibility that the police were
feeding Rivera details of the crime scene to make his account more
believable.203 Rivera, moreover, behaved so erratically during the short
window between his two confessions that he was confined to a padded
198. Cf. Ill. R. Evid. 404(a) (purporting to bar these sorts of inferences);
Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (permitting evidence of prior acts to be introduced
for non-propensity purposes).
199. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57–58.
200. Id.
201. But cf. Garrett, supra note 20, at 8 (concluding that over half of the
forty falsely confessing exonerees who succumbed to police pressure were
juvenile or mentally disabled); Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation:
Why Innocent People Confess, 32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 525 (2009)
(discussing the “phenomenon of false confession” and the influence of
interrogation).
202. Rivera, for instance, stated initially that Holly had changed into a
nightgown before their encounter, Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57, but this
was doubly improbable. Her corpse was wearing a T-shirt, not a
nightgown, when it was found, and the home in which she was
murdered was not her own, so there would have been no reason for her
to have a nightgown there in any event. See Trial Tr., supra note 15, at
013868, 014773.
203. See Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 66–67 (concluding that the police had
provided evidence to Rivera during the investigative process).
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cell for his own protection, placed on suicide watch by a jailhouse
nurse, and prescribed antipsychotic medications by a physician.204
And to the extent that the prosecution claimed he had confessed in
less pressurized settings, the prosecution was forced to rely on the
testimony of jailhouse inmates who could be impeached with both
their prior criminal records and their interest in receiving reduced
sentences for coming forward.205
Despite these inconsistencies, the prosecution used the confession
evidence in a way that would have maximized its associative impact.
A central feature of the prosecution’s strategy was the relentless
repetition of details from the confessions. Rather than present each
confession once or twice, the jury instead heard each confession from
multiple witnesses’ perspectives, some of whom repeated the
confession details several times over. For instance, the first witness to
describe the initial confession, Detective Donald Meadie, started by
relating the confession as Rivera told it to him, to lay the foundation
for admitting the written summary Rivera signed. Before concluding,
Detective Meadie then read that summary aloud to the jury,
effectively reporting the same confession twice.206 Another witness,
Sergeant Lou Tessman, went through the same lengthy and repetitive
process with the subsequent confession.207 Three more officers were
then called to recount what they had heard and seen during Rivera’s
two confessions.208 Finally, the prosecution layered on the far less
detailed confessions related by the two jailhouse informant
witnesses.209 Thus, the jury was taken through various versions of the
same story, in various forms and levels of detail, at least nine distinct
times.
With this manner of presenting the evidence, the common
elements among the initial and “corrected” confessions would have
forged strong associative links through sheer repetition.210 Thus,
Rivera would have become very strongly linked with the jurors’
unconscious representations of Holly, the murder weapon, the
stabbings, and the scene of the crime. Thinking of any one of these
204. E.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 017138, 017263–64, 017306–08.
205. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 58, 64–65.
206. Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 014611–61.
207. Id. at 014822–93.
208. Id. at 015446–015518, 015851–66, 015917–67.
209. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 58, 64–65.
210. See, e.g., Bechara et al., supra note 130, at 1293–94 (demonstrating
implicit learning of complex conditional information in a noisy
environment based on frequent repetition of stimuli); Destrebecqz &
Cleeremans, supra note 130, at 347–49 (same); cf. Simon, supra note
156, at 136 (noting that jurors will often use the “richness” of a
confession narrative as a proxy for its believability).
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things would cause a juror to readily and unconsciously bring Rivera’s
image to mind. In contrast, other details of the confessions conflicted
and would not have formed equally strong associations. For example,
Rivera reported staging a break-in in his second statement but not in
his first one; thus, the jurors would be much less likely to
automatically associate Rivera with the damage to the door. But
through punctuated repetition of links between Rivera, the crime
scene, and Holly, the prosecution made it easy for jurors to imagine
scenarios of Rivera holding the murder weapon and stabbing Holly
with it, while making it harder to imagine scenarios where those
elements did not occur in combination.
A very different story follows for the defense’s evidence. Although
it was quite strong analytically, the defense’s case was almost
certainly much less powerful than the prosecution’s case in terms of
its ability to forge strong associative links between Rivera and
innocence or between the crime and another perpetrator.211
First, the defense tried to paint a contrasting portrait of Rivera
for the jury, with testimony that portrayed him as a troubled and
frightened boy rather than a violent, strategic man. As framed by an
expert psychiatric witness, Rivera’s depression might have induced
him both to behave recklessly, because he did not value himself very
much, and to try very hard to please others, because of his low selfesteem.212 Coupled with an IQ that bordered mental retardation213 and
a lengthy, stressful police interrogation that left him sleep-deprived
and nearly psychotic,214 the defense tried to suggest that the
confession was a desperate attempt to please the investigators by
telling them whatever they wanted to hear.
Although this evidence may have provided good reasons to doubt
the prosecution’s theory of the case, it was less powerful in its ability
to build a strong set of competing associative connections suggesting
innocence. Some of the new suggested links might well have helped
Rivera: connecting him with youth and family,215 or with mental
211. To be clear, I do not intend to impugn the quality of the defense team,
who operated in a professional and impressive manner throughout the
trial. Rather, the difficulties arose due to the nature of the defense’s
evidence, the wide latitude that the prosecution had been given early
on, and the inability to introduce expert testimony that might have
weakened the associative force of the confession evidence.
212. Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 017552–53.
213. Id. at 017396.
214. Id. at 017410–23, 017456, 017554.
215. The defense called Rivera’s parents to provide him with an alibi on the
night of the murder, and this allowed some discussion of his home life
with them. See id. at 017693–017710 (questioning Rivera’s father about
his childhood). The defense also admitted into evidence a picture of
Rivera as a youth. Id. at 017700.
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retardation,216 might have served him well because those concepts may
be associatively linked with innocence. But associating Rivera with
mental illness or psychosis could have undermined those intuitive
links because jurors might well connect mental illness and recklessness
with guilt and antisocial behavior rather than with innocence.
Additionally, the mere fact that Rivera was required by standard
practice to present this evidence after the jurors had developed an
associative network that favored the prosecution’s case meant that
the defense had an uphill battle to win. Any time that an ambiguous
fact could be associated with guilt rather than innocence, the
structure of the preexisting network would make the guilt connections
easier to form than the innocent ones.217
Second, the key element of the defense’s case, the exclusionary
DNA profile, was likewise limited in its ability to speak in terms that
System 1 could process. The defense offered evidence, from two
experts, that the semen that had been deposited in Holly’s vagina
shortly before her death bore a single, unique DNA profile that was
not attributable to Juan Rivera but rather to an individual the
defense labeled as “Unknown Male #1.”218 At the level of System 1,
this evidence built a competing associative link between the
commission of the crime and this new figure, Unknown Male #1, and
degraded the existing link with Rivera that had been formed by the
repetitive confession testimony. But whereas Rivera’s side of the
216. Id. at 017396.
217. Dan Simon, Chadwick J. Snow, and Stephen J. Read observed a pattern
like this in a study they conducted to investigate cognitive consistency
theories. They first exposed participants to a substantial portion of
evidence in a hypothetical case, while instructing them that more would
be coming later on. They then obtained from their participants an
indication of which way the participants were “leaning,” either toward a
guilty or not-guilty verdict. Finally, they exposed the participants to
new evidence that was either strongly inculpatory (placing the
defendant near the scene of the crime) or strongly exculpatory
(establishing a solid alibi). Although this was not the focus of the study,
it is noteworthy that two-thirds of the participants who learned
information strongly inconsistent with their initial leanings ended up
rendering a verdict decision that aligned with their initial leanings
rather than with the strong new evidence. Strikingly, this occurred even
though the initial field of evidence was ambiguous enough to induce a
balanced number of participants to “lean guilty” and “lean not guilty,”
suggesting that even prior associations that are relatively weak can
resist displacement by strong new evidence. Dan Simon, Chadwick J.
Snow & Shephen J. Read, The Redux of Cognitive Consistency
Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 814, 824–27 (2004). I am grateful to
Dan Simon for pointing out this interpretation of their data in
correspondence.
218. People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 58–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
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network was richly detailed and thus mutually reinforcing,219 this
competing family of units would necessarily be weak because only
minimal detail could be attached to the unknown contributor of the
semen. Moreover, the strength of the competing connections would
not be determined merely by the rational probative force of the new
evidence but also by the frequency and conviction with which key
witnesses suggested the new associations. On these metrics, the
defense operated at an inherent disadvantage. Its experts were few in
number, and its arguments hinged on one single, powerful observation
rather than a multitude of less probative connections.
Furthermore, these new connections between the crime and
Unknown Male #1 were likely weakened significantly by the
prosecutor’s repeated attempts to elicit from defense witnesses some
acknowledgment that the exculpatory results could be attributed to
contamination.220 If conceived as an attempt to elicit evidence
favorable to the state’s theory of the case, this strategy was a failure
because no expert was willing to agree that contamination was a
likely explanation of the forensic results.221 But merely by asking the
question again and again, the prosecutors built one more connection
into this new family of units—an unconscious associative link between
the DNA testimony and the concept of contamination. Contamination
associates to various negative concepts, such as unreliability, and
invokes a generally negative emotional effect in connection with the
DNA evidence. As a result, our jurors would likely have been primed
to view the DNA evidence as less reliable than it otherwise would be
and to find thinking about the evidence as slightly more aversive and
unpleasant than they otherwise would. Thus, despite the judge’s
repeated instructions to the contrary,222 the arguments and questions
of counsel would have been integrated into the jurors’ unconscious
associative models just as readily as actual items of evidence in the
case.
At the close of the evidence, the jurors would likely have
constructed a rich associative model connecting the various items of
evidence, individuals, and events in the case, based in large part upon
the frequency with which those elements were encountered in
combination. Because of this internal tension in the unconscious
network, it would have been possible for jurors, depending on which
elements of the case they were focusing on at any one time, to find it
intuitive to link either Rivera or Unknown Male #1 with Holly’s
death. But for the reasons described above, the family of units that
tended to activate “Rivera” and “guilt” simultaneously would tend to
219. See supra Figure 8.
220. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 59.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018191–93.
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dominate the network most of the time. As a result, despite the
serious weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, which are plain from a
reflective distance, a juror who sat through the Rivera trial could
easily have found a verdict of guilty more intuitively plausible than a
verdict of acquittal.
D.

The Role of System 2 Reasoning in Shaping the Rivera Verdict

In the account I just outlined, a judge or juror listening to a case
can be thought of as building an unconscious associative network,
which links the people, events, and concepts involved in the case in a
network of excitatory and inhibitory relationships. This associative
model, once formed, functions by outputting intuitive feelings about
the facts of the case. But this System 1 cognitive activity is far from
the whole picture of how a fact finder will reach a verdict. In addition
to relying on their intuition, fact finders also employ the conscious
and effortful thinking styles that characterize System 2 cognition.
Depending on their motivations, fact finders might employ this type
of thinking either to advance their intuitive preferences or to resist
them.223 In this section, I explore some of the roles that this form of
cognition might have played as the jury deliberated the right result in
Rivera’s case, and, in particular, how System 2 may have been
employed to override any remaining doubts as the jury deliberated in
Rivera’s case.
We should begin by recognizing that some cases may require little
System 2 involvement by jurors. If, after hearing the evidence, the
right answer seems obvious and the law does not require a reasoned
explanation for the decision, a juror might vote for her strong
intuitive preference without engaging in much explicit thought or
discussion. We know, however, that the Rivera jury members did not
find the case easy or obvious: they deliberated for several days and
sent multiple notes to the judge during deliberations indicating that
they were finding it difficult to reach agreement.224 Thus, many of the
jurors were likely experiencing either an internal associative conflict or
a conflict with the intuitions of other jurors, and would have needed
to deploy System 2 resources in order to establish both internal and
external consensus about the verdict.
System 2 cognition may take several forms during the fact-finding
process. First, a fact finder will often find it useful to construct a
narrative to assist in deciding a case. Such narratives will organize the
facts of the case into “episode structures” that focus on chains of
cause and effect—particularly on the goals, choices, and actions of key
individuals in the case—rather than on the simpler correlational
information that forms the basis for the associative mechanisms
223. See discussion supra Part II.
224. E.g., Trial Tr., supra note 15, at 018205, 018255, 018269–70, 018301.
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described earlier.225 In some cases, these narratives might be
articulated only in a fact finder’s mind, as she strings together
individual aspects of the case in her working memory. In other cases,
the fact finder might communicate a narrative to others, either in oral
form (such as during jury deliberations) or in writing (as in the case
of a judicial opinion following a bench trial).226 Given the secrecy of
juror deliberations under modern law,227 we will never know for sure
whether the Rivera jurors found it useful to organize their thoughts
about the case into narrative form, but, given the case’s complexity,
it seems quite likely.
Narrative explanations will generally integrate both aspects of the
evidence actually heard during trial and “gap-filling” material that
helps to complete a particular aspect of a case’s story.228 Such gaps
might arise for many reasons. Sometimes the evidence may not have
included information that is necessary to help explain or justify a
decision. At other times, necessary information may have been
presented but then forgotten in the deluge of details that so often
accompany a complicated case. Thus, a story favoring the prosecution
that attempted to be consistent with the DNA forensic testimony
would require a juror to rely on assumptions regarding how, exactly,
an eleven-year-old girl had managed to die with semen in her vagina
that was not attributable to the person who raped and killed her. By
contrast, a story favoring the defense would require gap-filling
regarding why Rivera would have fabricated a fake alibi if he had a
real one available. As with any difficult case, neither side’s narrative
was free of gaps or inconsistencies.
When fact finders engage in gap-filling, we can expect cooperative
involvement by both cognitive systems. System 2 constructs an
explicit story based on the fact finder’s memory of the evidence, while
System 1 fills the gaps by supplying intuitions about what the
“missing pieces” are likely to be. Similarly, there may be a need to
address conflicting testimony when constructing explanatory stories.
Such choices will often be made based on an intuitive sense of which
225. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 67, at 248–51 (describing the
episode structure of cause and effect); cf. Sloman, supra note 117, at 4
(describing an “associative system” of reasoning for comparison with a
“rules based” system).
226. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring findings of fact to be set forth
in the record when a judge rules following a bench trial); Fed. R. Crim.
P. 23(c) (requiring findings of fact to be set forth in the record following
a bench trial if a party requests the judge to do so before the verdict is
rendered).
227. See Ill. R. Evid. 606(b) (prohibiting courts from requiring jurors to
testify regarding jury deliberations).
228. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 67, at 249 (noting that jurors fill
in gaps in testimony to construct complete episodes).
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witnesses are believable or which narrative chains are more likely to
occur in the real world. Once again, we might expect a fact finder to
resolve such disputes in part by choosing the version that intuitively
feels right.229
Saying that System 1 may help to shape the narrative that a fact
finder will find acceptable is not to say that it will so dominate the
process that the construction of a narrative will never causally affect
the outcome. A different jury hearing the Rivera case might also have
felt an associatively derived intuition that Rivera “felt” like a guilty
person. But that jury might have found that the hypothesis of guilt
was impossible to square with any articulable story, perhaps due to
the difficulty of constructing a plausible narrative of guilt that
explains the DNA evidence. In such a circumstance, the hypothetical
jurors might have the persistent intuition that the defendant is
somehow “getting away with something” yet still decide to vote for
acquittal.
In addition to constructing solitary narratives, some fact finders
might take this process a step further by engaging in an explicit
process of comparison between narratives favoring the prosecution
and defense. Thus, in a case like Rivera’s, a juror might feel that
neither the State’s nor the defense’s theory of the case can be rejected
outright because both are supported by some persuasive evidence. In
such cases, one sensible way to proceed is to engage in abductive
reasoning—imagining alternatively that each party’s story is actually
true and considering how well those stories would explain the given
pattern of evidence.230 Thus, Professors Allen and Pardo’s explanatory
conception of the proof process, which was offered as an epistemic and
normative model for what proper evidential reasoning should look
like,231 will in some cases form an important part of a juror’s reasoning
process, as a descriptive matter.
229. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 5, at 190–91 (noting that
judgments of story coherence will depend on whether the story is
consistent, plausible, and complete).
230. See Cheng, supra note 3, at 1266–68 (proposing the use of the
preponderance standard as a ratio test that compares the probability of
the narratives offered by the plaintiff and defendant); Pardo, supra note
39, at 596–97 (discussing an alternative conception that focuses on
potential explanations of the evidence).
231. Although Pardo and Allen sometimes labeled their model as
“descriptive,” e.g., Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 226, they do not use
that term in the way that I am employing it in this Article. Whereas I
conceive of descriptive models as attempting to describe real-world
reasoning practices, they initially developed their model as an attempt
to “expla[in] the legal proof process and its features,” id. at 268, in a
primarily epistemic sense. Compare id., with discussion supra Part I.
Thus, as Pardo clarifies in later work, he does not believe that the
explanatory theory of the proof process could be falsified by contrary
empirical data regarding real-world fact-finding practices; rather, it
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When placed within the context of a dual-process framework,
abductive reasoning might work either to further associative intuitions
or to restrain them, depending both on the cognitive complexity of
the case and the extent to which the fact finder is motivated to either
defend or resist her own intuitions. Like the simple story construction
discussed above, the process of abduction will necessarily demand
System 2 resources. The associative model, after all, is unitary and
holistic, and it cannot be instantly restructured by a simple act of
imagination.232 Rather, our fact finder must employ mental effort to
imagine a world in which the key facts alleged by one party are true
and focus on the likely pattern of evidence she would expect to see in
that world.233
Some elements of this process might involve further System 2
thinking in the form of explicit logical inferences. Often, however, the
abductive process will also depend on associative intuitions. It seems
likely that many jurors, if forced to choose between competing
plausible explanations, would proceed by imagining alternatively that
each story was true and then gauging which one feels more “right” at
a gut level. If the process takes this intuitive form rather than a more
analytical style, then the process of abduction will be substantially
constrained by the preexisting structure of the fact finder’s associative
network. In such instances, the use of abduction will tend to act in a
justificatory fashion rather than as a meaningful constraint on the
answer produced by System 1. Therefore, in cases where jurors engage
in an explicit comparison of stories, that process may have no causal
impact on the result except when jurors are motivated to question
and reconsider their intuitive judgments.
System 2 cognition may also give effect to legal rules that
constrain fact finders to reach results that do not necessarily accord
with their straightforward intuitions, such as burdens of proof. In civil
provides normative guidance when it conflicts with such practices. See
Pardo, supra note 39, at 598–99. This means that their theory would be
more clearly classified as normative—rather than descriptive or
doctrinal—when situated in my own typology. Understood in this light,
the discussion above is meant to explore the extent to which Pardo and
Allen’s normative conception of epistemically proper fact-finding
processes are realized in practice, an inquiry which is related to, but
distinct from, the central goals of their work. I am indebted to Mike
Pardo for useful correspondence on this point.
232. See Stanovich, supra note 28, at 66–67; Jonathan St. B. T. Evans et al.,
A Theory of Hypothetical Thinking, in Thinking: Psychological
Perspectives on Reasoning, Judgment, and Decision Making 3,
4–10 (David Hardman & Laura Maachi eds., 2003).
233. Cf. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234–35 (noting that fact finders
decide based on the relative plausibility of the versions of events put
forth by the parties and additional ones constructed by themselves or
fellow jurors).
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cases, which are typically resolved by a preponderance of the
evidence, this will rarely have a significant impact on a juror’s verdict
choice because a juror whose associative intuition favors guilt will
generally feel that guilt is more probable than not.234 In criminal
cases, the requirement of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” will
create a more complicated dialogue between the two systems of
reasoning.235 A juror who wishes to follow this instruction faithfully
may be motivated to resist a weakly dominant associative impulse
regarding a case’s outcome.
Thus, even if Rivera felt more guilty than innocent to most of the
jurors in his case, there were likely enough competing associations
raised by the defense that the jurors would have initially felt some
discomfort going along with their dominant intuition. By giving a
reasonable doubt instruction, a judge effectively urges that if a juror
has conflicting intuitions that are both strong enough to count as
“reasonable,” then the juror should choose innocence, even if she feels
a stronger intuitive pull toward finding the defendant guilty.236 In
some cases, this instruction may be effective in initiating a System 2
override of the dominant System 1 impulse, but we face a competing
possibility: jurors might try to resolve the conflict not by overriding
their dominant intuitions but instead by crafting arguments that help
to put their doubts to rest. If jurors were to spend a significant
amount of time exploring reasons to discount the defense’s theory of
the case, they might, through a new process of repetition, strengthen
their intuitions concerning guilt and weaken the associative
connections with innocence.237 With sufficient time and effort, the
jurors might discover that they no longer felt any “reasonable doubts”
after all.
This framework might well explain how the Rivera jury, after four
days of deliberation, was able to arrive at a result that seems
impossible to square with the reasonable doubt instruction. Much of
the time may have been spent not in trying to craft reasons to resist
their intuitions, but instead trying to minimize the reasons the
defense had given for doubting that their intuitions were correct. For
instance, with sufficient discussion of the idea that the forensic
evidence was contaminated, the jurors might have slowly degraded
the associations between the DNA evidence and Rivera’s innocence,
234. See 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal
Evidence § 3:5 (3d ed. 2007).
235. Id. at § 3:17.
236. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 238–39.
237. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 15–
16 (1989) (discussing the use of repeated invocation of contrary belief
structures to weaken a preexisting associative stereotype).
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making it easier to silence their internal doubts regarding his guilt. By
repeating a story to themselves with sufficient frequency, in other
words, the jurors may have come to believe it despite its lack of
foundation in evidence.238
When we pull these different strands of System 2 cognition
together, the resulting picture may seem murky. System 2 can play a
role in evidential inference through the construction of narratives or
arguments, through the analysis of hypothetical scenarios framed
around the parties’ theories, through explicit burden-of-persuasion
rules, or through the implementation of limiting instructions. In all of
these different guises, however, there is a common theme. Two
interacting forces will shape System 2’s effects: (1) the case-specific
intuitions that derive from the fact finder’s associative model and
(2) the motivational forces that encourage the fact finder to either
follow those intuitions wherever they might lead or, alternatively, to
resist the intuitions using one of the above-described strategies.
Globally, this interaction means that the standard approaches to
modeling fact-finding, which focus on the probabilistic or plausible
force of evidence to the exclusion of motivational influences, will often
fail to explain the results that jurors are likely to reach on a given set
of evidence. It also implies that we will not be able to dissolve the
link between flawed intuitions and erroneous outcomes simply by
encouraging more reflection, as some have argued.239 The Rivera jury,
after all, reflected for four days before returning a deeply flawed
verdict. Rather, we have two options. We can try to shape the factfinding process so that problematic intuitions are less likely to arise in
the first place. But if that fails, we must do more than just induce
fact finders to reflect before deciding—we must motivate them to
view their own intuitions from a detached distance.

IV. Professor Cohen’s Gatecrashers, or:
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love Statistical Evidence
In Part III, I offered a general account of the roles that both
System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes play in the realm of legal
fact-finding, using the case of People v. Rivera as an extended
example. Examining the case in these terms, I believe, helps to
explain the seemingly inexplicable willingness of twelve jurors to find
a man guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of rape and murder when
exculpatory DNA evidence clearly implicated an unknown third party
instead. This initial use of the dual-process model focused on its
unique descriptive power in explaining the ways in which jury
238. See id.
239. See Guthrie et al., supra note 27, at 29–40.
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intuitions might diverge from normative rationality, and the ways in
which they might use their deliberative faculties to further those
intuitions rather than resist them. Although the primary goal of the
dual-process model is descriptive, achieving better understandings of
the sources of our intuitive judgments about evidence has important
normative benefits as well. Going forward, I hope to show that
thinking of fact-finding in dual-process terms can also be helpful when
we address some of the common puzzles that have frustrated evidence
theorists when they have attempted to formulate models of
normatively justifiable trial results. In this final section, I will focus
on one such conundrum—the longstanding debate over the proper
probative force of naked statistical evidence.240 The dual-process
model of fact-finding does not directly tell us whether such evidence
should be trusted, but it does suggest that the widespread intuitive
distrust of verdicts that rest on purely statistical inferences about
guilt or liability may arise from the inability of such evidence to speak
in terms that our intuition can understand. As a result, theorists may
find themselves seeking to justify normatively suboptimal trial
outcomes out of a desire to defend intuitions that are not themselves
particularly trustworthy.
Recall Cohen’s paradox of the gatecrasher.241 A thousand people
went to the rodeo, but only 499 of them bought tickets. We know,
therefore, that 501 of them crashed the gate. Unfortunately, we
assume in this hypothetical that this is the limit of our knowledge; no
further evidence exists to discriminate between paying customers and
gatecrashers.242 As Cohen argues, “the balance of probability” would
support finding any randomly chosen attendee guilty if the rodeo
organizer sued to collect the ticket price, because there is a 0.501
chance that any randomly chosen patron was ticketless that night.
But, he maintains, this result would be an “absurd injustice,” with
the result that no judge or jury would ever convict a person under
such circumstances.243 Indeed, some courts have disallowed parties
240. By “naked” statistical evidence, I am referring to evidence that arrives
in a plainly statistical form; that is, it involves transparent and
quantifiable uncertainty. Although all sources of evidence do involve
some inherent uncertainties, and although neither explicitly statistical or
facially non-statistical evidence can be said to be superior as an a priori
matter, Pardo, supra note 39, at 573, the admissibility and probative
force of naked statistics in trials has been a subject of lengthy and
heated debate in the evidence literature. See generally Amit Pundik,
What is Wrong with Statistical Evidence? The Attempts to Establish an
Epistemic Deficiency, 27 Civ. Just. Q. 461 (reviewing literature).
241. Cohen, supra note 36, at 75.
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1187, 1192–94
(1979) (developing the similarly structured “Prison Yard” hypothetical);
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from using purely statistical evidence when parties seek to prove
whether a specific event in the past has actually occurred.244
A number of scholars have attempted to justify this sort of
intuition through analytic argument. Some have focused on the idea
that we can rationally draw some sort of “negative inference” from
the fact that more evidence was not offered, effectively concluding
that the plaintiff is hiding evidence.245 This seems, in the end, to
dodge the hypothetical, which is designed to force us to decide what a
fact finder should do when statistical evidence is the only source of
information.246 In that world, the rodeo organizer is not spoliating any
evidence and could not have found more even if motivated to do so,
so it would be senseless to punish the plaintiff for the first failure and
pointless to incentivize him or others to try harder in future, similar
cases.
Other theorists, including Jonathan Cohen, Alex Stein, and, more
recently, Edward Cheng, relying on the idea that purely statistical
proof lacks any individualized force against a particular defendant,
argue that the balance in such cases is purely even.247 As Cheng puts
it, we would encounter the same evidence whether the defendant was
innocent or guilty, so we have an equal probability of observing it
either way.248 But this argument suffers from two flaws. First, is it
really the case that we would be equally likely to observe the same
ratios either way? Perhaps not. The situation is analogous to our
position after being given a coin with an unknown bias, flipping it
once, and getting heads. It seems more likely, in such a circumstance,
that the coin is biased toward heads than tails, even though either is
within the realm of possibility. Similarly, it seems more likely that we
would observe a 501/499 ratio of crashers to payees in the case of a
particular defendant’s liability than innocence, given that we should

Tribe, supra note 36, at 1340–41 (developing the similar “Blue Bus”
hypothetical).
244. See, e.g., Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass.
1940) (finding that proving a proposition is mathematically favorable is
not enough to prove preponderance of the evidence); People v. Risley,
108 N.E. 200, 203 (N.Y. 1915) (holding the lower court erred in allowing
testimony regarding probability).
245. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 2, at 106; Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan L. Rev. 1477, 1508–10
(1999); Tribe, supra note 36, at 1349.
246. See Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.
L. Rev. 401, 411–12.
247. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 271; Alex Stein, Foundations of
Evidence Law 82–83 (2005); Cheng, supra note 3, at 1269–71;
cf. Allen, supra note 246, at 414 (critiquing this line of analysis).
248. Cheng, supra note 3, at 1270.

195

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding

expect more guilty “flips” in a world biased toward gatecrashers than
in a world biased toward payees.
The second flaw in the “no individualized force” argument is that,
even if we thought that the likelihood of observing this evidence was
equivalent either way, this still does not mean that the information is
useless. As Professors Cheng and Cohen both acknowledge, it is more
likely than not that even a randomly chosen defendant did, in fact,
crash the gate.249 In that sense, we do know something about the
defendant as an individual, although it happens to be the case that
we know the same thing about all the other rodeo attendees. The fact
that this logic, if applied in the aggregate, will lead to far too much
compensation for the rodeo is immaterial; after all, if we applied
Cohen’s preferred rule of no-liability the outcome would be even more
unjust in the opposite direction.250
My point in referencing this ongoing discussion is not, however, to
present a knock-down argument as to whether we should or should
not find a defendant guilty in the scenario Professor Cohen envisions
(or others like it). Instead, I suggest that thinking of this and other
similar examples in dual-process terms may reframe the debate and
reveal the potential dangers of relying on intuition as a guide toward
optimal decision making. Imagine, for a moment, a judge or juror who
heard a case that is as simple and short as Cohen described, with the
entire case amounting to little more than a recitation of the facts of
the number of tickets sold and the number of rodeo attendees, plus
some proof that the defendant was an attendee. Such testimony, given
its relatively abstract nature, would support only a minimal
associative model, as illustrated in Figure 9.

249. Cohen, supra note 36, at 75; Cheng, supra note 3, at 1270.
250. See Allen, supra note 246, at 413 (finding that Professor Cohen’s rule
would result in a situation where “denying recovery results in a larger
windfall, overall, to the defendants”).
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FIGURE 9: An associative model of the gatecrashers scenario with
neither sub-network dominating.

In a model like this, neither the liable-gatecrasher nor the
innocent-payee sub-networks would tend to dominate, because neither
the one nor the other occupied a greater length of time at trial or was
mentioned more frequently in connection with the defendant. Rather,
they both are connected to the defendant with approximately equal
associative weight. As a result, a fact finder trying to decide what to
do in such a case would likely find that their intuitions are silent.
Either finding the defendant liable or not liable feels unsupported, so
that the jurors do not feel like they know what happened to any level
of certainty.
The only answer that can be given in such a scenario must arise
from System 2 cognition. Perhaps, like Cohen, a judge or juror would
likely be inclined to preserve the status quo in the absence of a felt
conviction that the defendant did something wrong. Or perhaps, as
some courts have suggested, it is proper to defer to a mathematical
calculation indicating guilt or liability so long as that calculation is
rational and supported by a proper foundation in evidence, even if it
feels intuitively unsupported.251 So, unfortunately, just initiating
System 2 processing will not determine a unique outcome.
But one thing is clearer now than it might have been before: we
might not want to give any special deference to our intuitive
judgments in a case like this. The example, by construction, is novel
and foreign to our prior experience, so our past associations are
unlikely to provide any useful guide to resolving the case. The fact
that our associative network would not produce a dominant and
coherent result may not reveal any deep truths about the proper
resolution of a case like this. Instead, it might merely demonstrate

251. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38–39 (Cal. 1968).

197

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding

System 1’s inability to compute appropriate answers to problems that
are framed probabilistically.252
To see why this is the case, imagine an individual, Isabelle, who
rarely flies and rarely reads about safe air travel but watches a steady
diet of nightly news. Now imagine further that the local nightly news
show always covers airplane crashes, wherever they occur in the
world, because they make for dramatic viewing. What result is likely
to arise? Well, Isabelle will have relatively few associations between
air travel and safety (because she does not fly very often), but she will
have developed relatively strong associations between air travel and
danger because she often thinks about air travel in the context of the
disaster reports. The plausible result is that she feels tense and
nervous when she thinks about air travel and easily imagines scenes of
disaster—despite the fact that air travel is statistically quite safe and
that those reported disasters compose a vanishingly small fraction of
airplane trips. And because the unconscious system is trained by
patterns of co-occurring stimuli rather than explicit semantic
instructions, this could be the case even if Isabelle has been informed
that air travel is safer than driving, as a statistical matter.
Isabelle’s case illustrates a more general truth about the limits of
the intuitive judgments that our dual-process minds can generate.
Isabelle’s intuition was not a reliable guide to choosing a safe means
of air travel because it was trained on a non-representative sample of
co-occurrences between airplanes and accidents. This suggests a
broader principle: intuition may be a good guide when it incorporates
a fair quantity of representative and domain-specific experience, but
in other cases, it may be useless or even actively wrong.
Applying this principle to Cohen and company’s intuitions about
the gatecrasher case, we should see cause for concern. Logically, an
individual fact finder would have a similarly indeterminate set of
intuitions about the outcome of a gatecrasher case—whether the
payee/crasher ratio was 499/501, 400/600, or 600/400—because the
numbers alone would not lead either party to elaborate its case with
more detail, repetition, or vividness. But those differences, it seems,
should matter, at least if we want to minimize the social costs of
errors in the trial process. It is meaningfully different, from the
perspective of social cost, whether we are erring in forty percent
versus sixty percent of similarly situated cases, even if our
associatively generated intuitions were the same across the board.253

252. See generally Kahneman, supra note 28, at 109–18 (cataloging the
limited ability of System 1 to generate useful intuitions to statistically
framed questions).
253. See Allen, supra note 246, at 413 (noting that awarding victory to the
defendant in the rodeo case results in a suboptimal allocation of the risk
of error).
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As a result, it might be worthwhile to treat our intuitions about
purely statistical proof with care and caution. The dual-process
framework, as a descriptive matter, provides strong support for the
idea that real-world fact finders will generally be reluctant to sanction
a defendant based on statistical evidence alone because their
associative intuitions will provide no encouragement toward such a
result. But this descriptive account cannot teach us what the best
normative approach toward handling such cases would be.254 To
decide what jurors ought to do, we would ideally decide to defer to
some source of information that does incorporate relevant
considerations of social costs, such as the rate of errors likely under
different frameworks, the costs of those errors, and the impact of
differing rules on the system’s legitimacy or efficiency.255
Our intuitions about naked statistical proof are likely to be
inapposite to such goals, unfortunately. First, there are not many
cases in ordinary trial practice where naked statistics play a
significant role. Second, our system of trial by a lay jury further
reduces the extent to which such cases can be used to develop reliable
intuitions. Third, and most importantly, even if jurors and judges
were exposed to such cases with some frequency, they would not get
reliable feedback about outcome accuracy, so there would be little
means of training their intuitions to produce reliable outcomes. 256 In
short, it seems that the gatecrasher case is unable to generate strong
intuitions regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence, but it is
doubtful that this intuitive void has any deep meaning in terms of the
accuracy or fairness of the outcome. This suggests that the only
“paradox” that the gatecrashers present is this: Why does it feel so
wrong to do what is right, which is to ignore our intuitions, do the
math, and require a defendant who probably jumped a turnstile to
pay for his seat at the rodeo?

Conclusion
In this Article, I have tried to elaborate a dual-process account of
fact-finding and to illustrate why such an approach is valuable. The
dual-process view lays bare a hidden feature of fact-finding that has
received little attention in most existing formal and informal models
of the proof process—the significant role played by unconscious
254. See Simon, supra note 5, at 550–59 (urging that a coherence network
model might function well descriptively but that its outputs were not
necessarily a good guide to normatively correct inference).
255. See Pundik, supra note 240, at 463 (urging that we need a normative
model, not a descriptive one, if we are to draw inferences about the
desirability of using naked statistical evidence).
256. See Mark Spottswood, Evidence-Based
Louisville L. Rev. 25, 27 (2012).
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associative cognitive processes in constraining and generating verdict
decisions. System 1 can make a wrong decision feel right, as seen with
Rivera, and a potentially right decision feel wrong, as seen with naked
statistical data. But System 1 processes fly under the radar because
they are not subject to our conscious awareness or control. Their
effects can be hard to predict because they operate according to a
logic that sometimes defies common-sense ideas about fair and
accurate decision making. In the universe of the unconscious
associative system, two concepts can become connected based on their
mere co-occurrence in our sensory environments, and those
associations will cause us to expect to see those stimuli together in the
future. This simple fact of human nature has radical implications for
legal fact-finding: it means that jurors will draw inferences in ways
that disregard the legal separation between what is and what is not
“evidence” in the courtroom; treat the frequency of evidential
combinations as significant, even if it bears no real relation to that
evidence’s probative force; and be more receptive to evidence and
arguments when they go along with our (sometimes biased)
preexisting, unconscious expectations.
These new ways of understanding fact-finding cognition are not
mere academic curiosities, however. Rivera shows us that associative
cognition can play a powerful role in shaping our decisions and can
lead to results that we might not endorse from a reflective distance.
In that case, the prosecutor took a case that seemed like a loser and
presented it in a way that powerfully captured a jury’s intuitions,
arriving at a result that few observers would have predicted. Whether
we wish to exploit this effect as lawyers, understand it as scholars, or
prevent it from recurring as regulators of the trial environment, we all
share an interest in understanding what kinds of evidence are likely to
bring about unreliable or unfair intuitive judgments. To that end, I
hope that considering the jury’s view of the case from a dual-process
point of view has been illuminating.
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